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I. INTRODUCTION
The Trust Indenture Act of 1939 (hereinafter "TIA" or "the Act")' is one
of the most overlooked enactments in the area of securities law. Jurisprudence
involving the Act is scarce, and even before the Act was passed the corporate
trust indenture did not get much attention from either courts or commentators.
In 1928 Louis Posner wrote, "[I]t is noteworthy that.. .so little [was] written
upon in the 50 years during which this field of law has been developing.
Indeed, the comparatively few cases, which deal with the subject, leave many
of its problems altogether untouched."2 Not only courts but also legal scholars
have paid relatively little attention to the TIA. Furthermore, those who are
involved in the business of securities and bonds issuance are commonly
unaware of its existence. Even when aware, bondholders seldom appreciate
its significance. This article does not proclaim these investors wrong because
the current structure of the TIA, and the character of its main creation - the
indenture trustee - support such an attitude. Designed to protect investors, the
TIA is seldom capable of effectively doing so, and therefore it is thought of
as a technical, burdensome and even archaic piece of legislation. But it is
questionable whether investors and society as a whole can really afford to
ignore a mechanism that could protect investments that lubricate the economy.
One of the most popular ways of borrowing money from the public is to
issue debt securities, commonly referred to as bonds.' In fact, bond issuance
by corporations is probably one of the most significant factors in the
development and success of the industrialized world and has contributed to the
economy through the advancement of capital to corporations.4 And in fact, the
bond market is far larger than the stock market.5 From 1991 to 1993,
The TIA is found at Tite 15 of the United States Code.
2 Louis S. Posner, Liability of the Trustee Under the Corporate Indenture, 42 HARV. L REV. 198
(1928).
A few remarks should be made with regard to the terminology used in this article. "Indenture
securities" in the United States are popularly classified as "bonds," which are long-term and secured
obligations, and "debentures," which are long-term unsecured obligations. Short-term obligations, either
secured or unsecured, are commonly referred to as "notes." For convenience reasons, the term "bonds" will
be used here for all long-term obligations, unless otherwise mentioned, and the holders of those obligations
will be identified as bondholders. Also note that the terms "obligor" and "issuer" are used interchangeably
and refer to the corporation which has issued the bonds and therefore carry the obligation to pay back the
debt. The indenture trustee or corporate trustee will be simply regarded as "the trustee."




companies raised three times more money from bond issues than from stock
6issues.
Nevertheless, the success in raising capital by issuing bonds did not come
without a price. Indeed, throughout the years, bondholders have experienced
some dramatic losses.' In the 1970s, such losses were attributed to the
recapitalization methods employed by many corporations.' The hostile
takeover wave of the 1980s was blamed for the next surge of bond defaults.9
During the 1990s, mergers and acquisitions were pointed to as a factor in
increasing the financial risk of corporations. 0 Consequently, one must ask
whether the legal network that governs bond issuance adequately protects the
bondholders.
Apart from the securities laws, the most important legislation that controls
bonds is the TIA. The Act relies on a contract - the trust indenture - to
define the rights and responsibilities of the corporate obligor, the bondholders,
and the trustee. The trustee is in the center of the mechanism that was
designed to protect bondholders. The trustee is also at the center of this
study's discussion.
The second section of this study provides a historical background that
describes the earliest usage of the indenture and the corporate trustee.
Thereafter, the developments leading to the enactment of the TIA are
examined. These developments highly contributed to the drafting process of
the TIA and they also illustrate the necessity of a protective mechanism for
bondholders. In the third section, the TIA is generally described, with special
attention to the important amendments of 1990.
The fourth section is dedicated to the trust indenture. Unfortunately,
bondholders are usually unaware of the existence of the indenture, let alone
its specific provisions.
The fifth section deals with the trustee's role in the pre-default situation.
The section strongly suggests that the customary distinction between the
trustee's duties pre-default versus post-default is undesirable and does not
serve the bondholders' interests. This assertion is further argued in the sixth
section, which deals with conflicts of interest and illustrates how the
problematic conflict between the trustee and the bondholders mightjeopardize
6 See id.
See id. at 567.
See Ronald W. Masulis, The Effects of Capital Structure Change on Security Prices, 8 J. FIs.
ECON. 139, 171 (1980).
9 See Kahan, supra note 4, at 567.
10 See Marcel Kahan & Micheal Klausner, Anti-takeover Provisions in Bonds: Bondholders
Protection or Management Entrenchment?, 40 UCLA L REV. 931, 933 n.2 (1993).
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the bondholders' chances of getting their money back, both before and after
default.
In the seventh section, the post-default role of the trustee is examined. The
eighth section reviews the possible causes of action available to bondholders
who have suffered losses due to the trustee's conduct. In the ninth and final
section, a recent article, written by Yakov Amihud, Kenneth Garbade and
Marcel Kahan, which suggests a new governance structure for corporate
bonds and introduces a new concept of "supertrustee," is examined and
criticized.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
First known as a "corporate mortgage," a trust indenture has been used as
the basis for selling corporate obligations to the public for almost 170 years.'
It later became known as a "trust indenture."'" The earliest example of a trust
indenture in the United States dates back to 1830 and was known as a "Dutch
loan."' 3 In this transaction, the Morris Canal & Banking Company conveyed
its property in trust to an Amsterdam merchant in order to secure a loan of
$750,000, which was made by several individuals. 4 The trustee was given the
right to take possession of the mortgaged premises in case of default and to
take and receive the rents and profits. 5 The legal instrument that was used was
a "deed of trust," which served as a common-law mortgage. 6 With a deed of
trust, the legal title of the property is placed in one or more trustees, to secure
the repayment of the debt.'7 By 1860, the use of a trustee as the bondholders'
representative became common." In 1873, when dealing with a mortgage that
made no provision for a trustee, the United States Supreme Court noted that
it was "a departure from ordinary practice."' 9 Ever since, the American
industry has strongly relied on obligation issuance under trust indentures to
finance its extraordinary growth throughout the 20th Century.
In the 19th Century, the construction of railroads and other transportation
means required large investments.2 However, the corporations involved in
11 See Cecil M. Draper, A Historical Introduction to the Corporate Mortgage, 2 ROCKY MNT. L
REv. 71, 76 (1930).
12 See id. at 86.
13 See Talcott M. Banks, Indenture Securities and the Barkley Bill, 48 YALE L. 533 (1939).
14 See Draper, supra note 11, at 76.
Is See id. at 77.
16 See id.
17 See generally Larchmont Homes, Inc. v. Annandale Water Co., 110 S.E.2d 249 (Va. 1959).
is See GeorgeE. Palmer, Trusteeship Underthe TrustIndenture, COLUM. L REv. 193,195(1941).
19 Nashville & Decatur R.R. Co. v. On', 85 U.S. 471 (1873).
2D See Banks, supra note 13. at 538.
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these industries could no longer rely on large financing institutions for
funding, for that source of capital was limited.2" Rather, they needed access
to the public's capital.22 To attract the conservative investing public, the
investment had to be secured.23 The customary security of those days was a
mortgage on the debtor's property. However, given the large number of
investors, who were often geographically scattered, a simple mortgage was
impractical. 24  These numerous lenders were therefore in a particularly
vulnerable position because their incentive to monitor the issuer and make
decisions regarding an enforcement action was largely reduced.2" Under these
circumstances, a bondholder found it very hard, if not impossible, to detect
any breaches in the loan agreement.'
A plan was therefore introduced in which the mortgage was granted to a
single individual, who held it in trust for the investors. 2' This arrangement
fulfilled two functions. First, before default, the trustee was merely a
repository of the noteholders' interests in the security, which was held in
escrow or as a stakeholder.28 Second, after default, if foreclosure was
necessary, the trustee was the investors' agent to effectuate the foreclosure.29
The position required only a reliable person, and little regard was paid to
conflicts of interest. ° Thus, there were examples of the same individual
acting as trustee under two or more mortgages executed by the same
company.3
By the end of the 19th Century, the trustee's powers and duties had
increased, largely to the benefit of the investors.32 Consequently, it was
customary to appoint two or three individuals to hold the position of the
trustee.33 At a later stage, the individual trustee or trustees were frequently







2 See Draper, supra note 11, at 74.




32 See id. at 536.
3 See Draper, supra note 11, at 81-82.
34 See id. at 83.
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The earliest examples of corporate trustees were designed as certificates
of deposit or escrow agreements rather than as trustee deeds.3 5 These legal
instruments were designed to secure some assets in favor of creditors and
allowed execution of the debt by a third party if the triggering events
occurred. 6 Although different from a modem trusteeship, such certificates of
deposit and escrows were the direct ancestors of the corporate indenture
trustee as we know it today.37
In general, corporate trustees became common after 1880.3' The initial
intent was to avoid the problems related to a trustee's death, but the aim
eventually became to accommodate the trustee's growing burden. 39 At that
time, no attention was paid to the question of conflicts of interest.'
III. THE TRUST INDENTURE AcT OF 1939
The 1929 financial crash and the Great Depression of the 1930s were
obviously the main incentives for the legislative decision to regulate the
securities market." Thanks to numerous defaults, financial collapses, and
personal tragedies of that era, the financial community and many trust
institutions suffered a sudden decline in public respect, faith and goodwill.42
One commentator, writing in the midst of the Depression, thought that the
conduct of indenture trustees had contributed to those losses.43 He asserted
that the fiduciary duties of indenture trustees were poorly implemented and
35 See id. at 84. The mason for using deposit and escrow structures to execute those transactions
was due to the uncertainty concerning the power of the corporation to act in a trustee's capacity. This doubt
soon evaporated, however, and it became customary to use cooperate trustees, first under a regular trust
deed and later under an indenture.
3 See id. at 79.
37 See id. at 85. In 1835, the Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., considered the earliest corporate trustee,
held funds in trust for the Long Island Railroad Co. under what was "clearly a certificate of deposit."). See
also Banks, supra note 13, at 535. In 1839, the Girard Life Insurance, Annuity & Trust Co. was a trustee
of obligations issued by Beaver Meadow Railroad & Coal Co. under what can be viewed as an escrow
agreement.
38 See Banks, supra note 13, at 538.
39 See id.
40 See Draper, supra note 11, at 79 (corporations were serving as trustees under separate mortgages
of the same companies and officers of the mortgagor were appointed as trustees); see also Pittsburgh
Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 680 F.2d 933 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1056 (1982)
(the company's road was mortaged to the president of the company and his successors as trustees of the
bondholders).
41 See, e.g., Frederica R. Obrzut, The Trust Indenture Act of 1939: The Corporate Trustee as
Creditor, 24 UCLA L REV. 131, 135 (1976); see also Henry F. Johnson, The 'Forgotten' Securities Statute:
Problems in the Trust Indenture Act, 13 U. ToL L REv. 92,93-6 (1981).
42 See, e.g., Obrzut, supra note 41.
43 See Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARV. L REV. 1, 8 (1934).
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implied that the relief of such trustees from their obligations by "clever legal
devices" would be regretted.' In the specific market of obligation issues, the
uncertainty that surrounded the trustees' conduct and duties contributed to the
atmosphere leading to the loss of confidence and eventually to chaos.4 The
Trust Indenture Act can be seen as part of the general effort to re-establish the
public confidence in the money market and the securities market.'
Just prior to the TIA, investor losses spawned a large number of lawsuits
against trustees alleging breach of fiduciary duty.47 Unfortunately, this
litigation ended up adding even more confusion to the subject as no consistent
jurisprudence developed from the litigation.4"
The loss of confidence in the American financial structure dictated a
reaction from Congress. The first legislation was the Securities Act of 1933
(hereinafter "the Act"),49 which mainly required an issuer of securities to
disclose information prior to issuance and imposed penalties for
misrepresentation and misleading investors. Following that, the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 was enacted and established the Securities and
Exchange Commission (hereinafter "the SEC").-'
The SEC appointed a committee, which submitted its report to Congress
in June 1936.5" The SEC conducted an investigation and stated its
observations and conclusions in a report, which highly criticized the existing
modus operandi of public financing debt.52 The dramatically written report
Id.
4s See Obrzut, supra note 41, at 134-35.
See Johnson, supra note 41, at 93.
47 See Banks, supra note 13.
4 See Green v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 227 N.Y.S.2d 252, 256 (N.Y. App. Div. 1928) (the
court ruled that provisions in the indenture, aimed at providing the trustee with immunity, did not lessen
the trustee's duties in relation to the mortgage); see also Posner, supra note 2, at 201 (regarding the Green
decision as "a departure from precedent." and troubled by the court's emphasis on the trustee's status as
a fiduciary instead of the trustee's status as being a creation of the contract and bound only by the contract's
provisions); Hazzard v. Chase Nat'l Bank of the City of New York, 287 N.Y.S. 541 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1936),
(The indenture provided that the obligor could take back the pledged stock if he substituted it with other
stock that met certain minimum requirements. The obligor took advantage of this clause with the
permission of the trustee. However, the company that issued the substitute security went bankrupt. This
resulted in a total loss of value to the bondholders who claimed that the trustee was negligent when it
approved the exchange of security. In court, the trustee relied upon an exculpatory clause in the indenture,
claiming it fully complied with the terms of the indenture. The court concluded that it could not impose
liability on the trustee in accordance with the view that the indenture is the only source of the trustee's
obligations.); Banks, supra note 13, at 545 (suggesting that the case did not represent good law and that
courts in other jurisdictions could rule otherwise or that the case was severely limited to its facts).
49 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq. (1997).
50 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a et seq. (1997).
51 See Johnson, supra note 41, at 96.
52 See Obrzut, supra note 41, at 132-33.
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ascertained the shortcomings of trustees by describing litigated cases noting
that "the interests of prospective purchasers of securities are adequately
represented by no one.""a In some of the described cases, there were
indications of active fraud by the trustee.' Other cases, like Hazzard v. Chase
National Bank, reflected the broad exculpatory clauses in indentures that
allowed negligent trustees to escape liability.55 The decisive conclusion of the
report was that investors must have "an active guardian of their interests
throughout the entire life of the security."'  This "active guardian" was
further defined as a guardian stripped from all conflicting interests and
carrying full fiduciary duties."7
Following the SEC's report, the Barkley Bill was introduced to the Senate
in 1937. The purpose of the bill was three-fold:
1. To assure there is full disclosure throughout the life of the
securities, and not just at issuance.
2. To provide a mechanism that will allow bondholders to convene
and act for the sake of their interests.
3. To assure that the indenture trustee is disinterested and conforms
to high standards of conduct. "
The modified bill was enacted as the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 and
became effective as of February 3, 1940."9 The TIA was passed three years
after the SEC's report was issued and apparently had "less harsh solutions"
than the ones presented by the report." This outcome was attributed to the
conception that the report was extremely prejudiced against the business
sector.6 Some believe that the early years of the SEC's operation were
characterized by an overly enthusiastic approach directed at thoroughly
regulating the securities market for the supposed benefit of the investors.62
53 SECURTIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE
WORK, AcIvIIES, PERSONNEL, AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES
PART VI-TRUSTEES UNDER INDENTURES 22 (1936) [hereinafter "SEC Report"].
54 See Banks, supra note 13, at 537.
55 Hazzard v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 287 N.Y.S.2d 541 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1936).
56 SEC Report, supra note 53, at 25.
57 See Banks, supra note 13, at 537.
59 See H.R. REP. No. 76-1016 (1939); see also RobertG. Miller, The Trust Indenture Act of1939,
25 CORNELL L REV. 105, 109 (1939).
59 Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 77s (1997).
60 Obrut, supra note 41, at 133.
61 See id. at 133 n.7.
62 See id.
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According to Robert Landau, the enacted TIA differed from the initial SEC
report and from the Barkley Bill in the role of the SEC after the issuance of
the bonds.63 Both the report and the bill recommended that the SEC should
have continuous supervisory administration, whereas the TIA requires that the
indenture would adhere to the SEC's "qualification" only upon registration of
the securities." No continuing supervisory powers were granted to the SEC.
This limited authority of the SEC is even more surprising in light of the broad
enforcement powers given to the SEC under Section 20 of the Securities Act
of 193365 and under Section 21 of the Securities Act of 1934.'
In any case, the investing public was presumed to be fully protected by the
trustee under the TIA.67 One commentator noted that it was hoped that the
TIA would be the investor's silent representative during the drafting of the
indenture." The trustee was then expected to be a louder representative with
the power to act in the best interests of the scattered bondholders.
The TIA applies to notes, bonds, debentures, and other certificates of
indebtedness, whether or not secured.69 It also applies to certificates of
interest or participation of such a note including a temporary one.' ° The TIA
demands that any issuer of public bonds qualifies by subjecting itself to the
TIA's requirements, with certain exemptions. Examples of these exemptions
are issues made by a foreign government, 7' issues exempted by the Securities
Act of 1933,7 and issues of less than $10,000,000. 73 The latter exemption is
designed to reflect the size and capital needs of American businesses while at
the same time enabling small corporations to issue debt without the costs
involved in the selection and administration of an indenture trustee. 4
63 See ROBERT 1. LANDAU, CoRPORATE TRUST ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT 37 (4th ed.
1992).
6 15 U.S.C. § 77eee(b).
6 Id. § 77s.
Id. § 78u.
67 See Howard M. Friedman, Updating the Trust Indenture Act, 7 J. L REFORM 329,330 (1974).
6 See Obrzut, supra note 41, at 135.
69 See 15 U.S.C. § 77ddd(a)(1).
70 See id.
71 See id.
2 Securities exempt under the Securities Act of 1933, and therefore exempted under the TIA
include government securities, bank securities, insurance policies, commercial paper, securities of
completely intrastate issue and securities of charitable, non-profit organizations. See James E. Spiotto,
Overview of SEC Regulation and Investigation Relevant to Indenture Trustees and Defaulted Bonds, 288
PLI/REAI267, exhibit A (1987). Securities sold in "private placement" transactions are also exempted. See
15 U.S.C.§ 77ddd(a)(4).
7 See id. § 77ddd(a)(9).
74 See Johnson, supra note 41, at 98. The threshold amount was initially set at $250,000, and was
revised in 1976 to $10,000,000. Indenture trustees' fees fdr an unsecured bond generally range from $5,000
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In general, the legislation establishes certain minimum requirements
directed at the trustee as well as the obligor. It imposes specified
responsibilities, accountability and qualifications upon the trustee, along with
a compulsory inclusion of certain provisions in the indenture. Of course, the
TIA does not eliminate the occurrence of defaults, as no reasonable legislation
could, but does give the contractors of the indenture a promising framework
for the transaction. In comparison to the situation prior its enactment, the TIA
provides better protection for investors. The most visible evidence of the
success of the TIA in the business world is its adoption by indentures that are
not governed by the Act (as in the case of direct placements).
A. Trustee-related Issues Under the Trust Indenture Act
The eligibility requirements for trustees are set forth in Section 310 of the
TIA.7 5 These requirements apply to both the original trustee and to a
successor trustee should there be one.76 Federal; state or territorial law must
authorize the trustee to exercise corporate trust powers.77 The TIA demands
that at least one of the trustees is organized to do business under the laws of
the United States.7" The trustee must also continuously have a combined
capital and surplus of no less than $150,000. 79 This requirement makes it
unlikely that the trustee would be an individual. Given the broad and
burdensome tasks of the trustee, this was one of the goals of the TIA °
However, these minimum requirements allow almost any banking institution
normally exercising trust powers to act as an indenture trustee.8' Many
indentures, however, impose a minimum combined capital and surplus of $5
million, and some indentures require the trustee to have at least $25 million
of combined capital and surplus at all times. 82
Conflicts of interest, discussed later, 3 are one of the central difficulties in
this area. One of the main objects of the writers of the SEC's report and of the
TIA was to disqualify any institution with a conflict of interest from being a
to $ 10,000 per year. See Yakov Amihud et al., A New Government Structure for Corporate Bonds, 51
STAN. L REV. 447, 479 n. 111 (1999).
7 See 15 U.S.C. § 77jjj.
76 See id. § 77jjj(a)(l).
7 See id
7 See id.
7 See id. § 77iii(a)(2).
so See LANDAU, supra note 63.
91 See id.
82 See id.
93 See discussion infra Part V1.
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trustee for a specific issuer.8 Indeed, this disqualification was one of the
innovations introduced by the TIA. The Act specifically addresses trusteeship
under more than one indenture, ownership of securities by the trustee, and
other affiliations between the trustee and the obligor.8 5 Yet, while setting
some "rules of thumb," the Act did not eliminate all potential conflicts, and
the issue remained under debate, at least until it was amended in 1990.6
"Exculpatory provisions," which were an attempt to exempt the trustee
from liability for any act or failure to act, short of willful misconduct or gross
negligence, were also addressed by the TIA 7 These provisions were subject
to criticism and controversy before the TIA came into effect, because it had
been customary to include them in indentures.8" Section 315(d) of the TIA
prohibits the inclusion of such broad immunity provisions in the indenture.8 9
It determines that the trustee would be responsible for its negligent action or
failure to act and its willful misconduct.' Yet, the trustee is still immunized
against any error in judgment made in good faith by a responsible officer
where the trustee was not negligent in ascertaining the pertinent facts.9
Section 315 of the TIA describes the trustee's duties and responsibilities.9
According to Section 315(a), prior to default, the trustee may be liable only
for duties the indenture specifically sets out.93 Therefore, unless otherwise
instructed, the trustee bears no implied duties, but only explicit ones. The
same applies in post-default situations, with the addition of setting "the
prudent person" standard as to the degree of skill and care required from the
trustee at this stage.9 These provisions made the indenture itself a highly
important document as to the trustee's duties and emphasized the contractual
nature of the indenture.
B. The Trust Indenture Reform Act of 1990
The first comprehensive revision of the TIA became effective as of
November 15, 1990. The Trust Indenture Reform Act of 1990 (hereinafter
U See Friedman, supra note 67, at 329 n.4.
u See 15 U.S.C. § 77ilj(b).
6 See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 67, at 330.
See 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(d).
See generally Banks, supra note 13.
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'TIRA") was designed to modernize the fifty-year-old TIA.95 The TIRA
provisions apply to all outstanding indentures." In cases of conflict between
the TIRA and an existing indenture, which are not related to optional
provisions, the TIRA will prevail. 9  Thus, Congress applied the TIRA
retroactively. 98
Regarding eligibility of a trustee, the TIRA enables a foreign bank to
become a trustee under specific conditions." It also increases the efficiency
of the issuance process by allowing the obligor to register the securities and
apply for the trustee's approval by the SEC simultaneously.'0 However, the
minimum requirement of $150,000 of combined capital and surplus and other
substantive requirements were not altered."° Although not directly connected
to the bondholders' investment, the fact that these qualifying factors were not
updated on this occasion casts doubt on the modernizing effect of the TIRA.
The fact that the market itself tends to adjust to reality and demands higher
standards from the trustee, surely cannot justify the low threshold the TIA
sets.
Regarding conflicts of interest, the TIRA prohibits the trustee from being
or becoming a creditor of the obligor and its affiliates."° This modification
was probably the result of strong criticism by many commentators and was the
most promoted proposition recommended over the years.'0 3 On the other
hand, the TIRA allows the postponement of the trustee's resignation for any
conflict of interest until there is a default under the indenture." There is an
exception according to which the obligor and its affiliates cannot serve as
trustees for its own securities at all times.0 Still, the suspension of
resignation may point out that the TIA recognizes and emphasizes the
administrative role of the trustee prior to default."° In any case, there is little
's See Trust Indenture Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L No. 101-550,104 Stat. 2721(1990).
" See id.
See id.
9 See 15 U.S.C. §77rrr(c).
9 See id.
10D See Trust Indenture Reform Act, 104 Stat. 2721.
101 See id.
102 See Trust Indenture Act of 1939 § 310(b)(i), 15 U.S.C. § 77.jjj(b)(i) (1997).
103 See, e.g., John P. Campbell and Robert Zack, Put a Bullet in the Poor Beast, His Legs Are
Broken and His Use Is Past. Conflict of Interest in the Dual Role of Lender and Corporate Indenture
Trustee: A Proposal To End It in the Public Interest, Bus. LAw. 1705, 1710 (1977); see also Johnson,
supra note 41, at 101.
104 See 15 U.S.C. § 77jii(bXi).
a Id. § 77jjj(b)(iui).
106 See LANDAU, supra note 63, at 58.
THE INDENTURE TRUSTEE
doubt that even after the TIRA, the TIA does not provide a thorough solution
to the problem of conflicts of interest.
The TIRA also eliminated the need to set out all the provisions of TIA
Sections 310 through 317 in the indenture."°n These provisions include,
among other things, directions regarding the eligibility and duties of the
trustee, and reports furnished by the trustee and the obligor.'0° The TIRA now
mandates such provisions as a matter of federal law."° It incorporates them
in the indenture and they are presumed to control the relationship unless they
are expressly excluded."0 Thus, the trustee's annual report is now sent to
bondholders only at the occurrence of enumerated changes in circumstances
and not automatically each year."' In contrast, the obligor is required to
provide the trustee with an annual no-default certificate signed by the
principal executive officer, the principal financial officer, or the principal
accounting officer."2
Two more significant modifications were included in the TIRA. One is the
determination that a trustee's successor will become effective only upon
fulfilling eligibility requirements (so that a no-trustee situation is never
possible)." 3 The other is the granting to the SEC of a wide authority to
exempt any person or security from the provisions of the Act." 4
The TIRA amendments were the result of a five-year ad hoc effort of seven
major corporate-trustee banks." 5 Although its purpose was to formally
furnish the market with a modernized TIA, the amendments seemed to have
benefited the trustee and obligor more than the investors. Admittedly, the
TIRA attempted to resolve the problem of the conflict of interest when the
trustee is also a creditor of the obligor. Nevertheless, the TIRA did not make
any dramatic modifications in the role of the trustee and its defined duties and
responsibilities (especially prior to default) and it did not provide adequate
solutions to the various problems raised and dealt with by courts and scholars
over the years.




,I See id § 77mmm(a).
112 See id. § 77nnn(c).
11 See id. § 77jii(a)(1).
14 See id. § 77ddd(d).
,"5 See LANDAU, supra note 63, at 39.
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IV. THE TRUST INDENTURE
A. The Nature of the Trust Indenture
Throughout the years the trust indenture has been used, its legal nature has
never been clearly defined. Is it a trust subject to the trust law or is it a
mortgage? Or is it merely a contractual instrument? Courts have struggled
with these questions ever since the trust indenture came into existence yet no
uniformity as to the trust relationship has evolved. The answer to these
questions is not purely theoretical. It comes down to the nature of the
relationships between the parties, including the duties they bear and the rights
to which they are entitled. The result, therefore, of any given dispute between
the parties is largely determined by how the indenture is defined in court.
In Ashurst v. Montour Iron Co;, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court defined
the relationship under a trust indenture as "tripartite in substance and
effect."" 6 The two contracting parties, the obligor and the trustee, were
regarded as having a mortgage-based relationship, in which one is a mortgagee
and the other a mortgagor.' 7 The court recognized the creditors as a party to
the indenture."' It described them as "unascertained indeed, when the
instrument is made, but well-known as a party when the remedies come to be
discussed."'" 9 The court concluded that between the creditors and the trustee,
the indenture is "nothing but a trust."' This two-headed analysis, made in
1860, was still regarded as the best suggestion for legal interpretation of the
nature of this document, at least until the enactment of the TIA, if not long
after.
Before the TIA was enacted, courts struggled with the issue of how to deal
with an indenture trustee. On the one hand, the trustee was obligated to a
class of beneficiaries much like a traditional trustee. On the other hand, its
duties were limited by the terms of the indenture with many exculpatory
clauses.
Most pre-TIA courts found the indenture trustee to be, both in theory and
in practice, considerably less than a genuine trustee.'2 ' However, in Hazzard
v. Chase National Bank, the court held that the trustee is essentially a
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121 See Martin D. Sklar, The Corporate Indenture Trustee: Genuine Fiduciary or Mere
Stakeholder?, 106 BANKING L. 42, 50 (1989).
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stakeholder and its rights and duties are determined exclusively by the
indenture."' Other courts, like the influential Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, found in the case of Frishmuth v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.,
that a trustee bears full fiduciary obligations arising solely from the relations
between the parties regardless of the terms of the indenture."3 In Frishmuth,
the trustee had failed to examine the value of the property that served as
security for the debt. 4 The property was eventually found to be worthless
and the court regarded as irrelevant the limited duty of the trustee explicitly
described in the indenture and the broad exculpatory clause. 5 It was held
that the trustee's duties "are not those only which are defined by the terms of
the [indenture].' 2 6
Some scholars asserted the relationship between the trustee and its
beneficiaries as personal or family trust relations. 27 Others considered the
relationship as sui generis in character "combining elements of several other
legal relationships but being identical with none."'' 2  Of course, courts were
no less divergent than the scholars. On different occasions, courts held that
the relationship between the trustee and the bondholders was fiduciary, 29 or
subject to agency theory, '" or contractual in nature.13' Currently, most courts
agree that the indenture does not create a trust relationship as customarily
considered in the private field, but many of them still regard the trustee as
subject to full fiduciary responsibilities.
The Second Circuit in Dabney v. Chase, for example, stated that the trustee
must give his beneficiaries "undivided loyalty.' 32 In United States Trust Co.
of New York v. First National Bank, a successor trustee claimed that the
original trustee favored its own interest as creditor of the issuer over the
bondholders' interest. 33 The original trustee contended that its duties were
purely contractual and that it was not really a trustee in the traditional
'2 Hazzard v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 287 N.Y.S.2d 541 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1936).
2. Frishmuth v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 95 F. 5, 8 (S.D.N.Y. 1899).
,2 See id. at 5.
125 See id. at 8.
126 Id.
127 See LANDAU, supra note 63, at 22.
129 Id.
"' See, e.g., York v. Guaranty Trust Co., 143 F.2d 503, 513 (2d Cir. 1944), reversed on other
grounds, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
130 See, e.g., First Trust Co. of Lincoln v. Carlsen. 261 N.W. 333 (Neb. 1935).
13 See e.g., Hazzard, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 564.
132 Dabney v. Chase, 196 F.2d 668,671 (2d Cir. 1952).
13 United States Trust Co. of New York v. First Nat'l Bank, 394 N.Y.S.2d 653,660-61 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1977). See id. at 660-61.
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meaning." a The court, rejecting the contentions of the original trustee, held
the trustee liable for breach of its fiduciary obligation of loyalty.'35 The court
added that regardless of the very narrow duties defined in the indenture, the
TIA was not intended to take away from bondholders any protection they had
before, but only to add protections. 36 In Broad v. Rockwell, the First Circuit
Court of Appeals published a less clear decision, but it still imposed fiduciary
duties on trustees. 37 The Broad court held that the TIA already includes a
fiduciary obligation and the trustee's duties should be read from the TIA, the
indenture and the state law.1
38
To shuffle the cards again, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in a
decision subsequent to Broad, determined that the trustee had no additional
obligation to the terms of the indenture. 39 In Meckel v. Continental
Resources, the bondholders argued that the trustee had certain obligations
regarding the mailing of redemption notices. "'4 Although the court could have
simply said that the trustee's conduct regarding the notices was reasonable, it
instead quoted from the ancient Hazzard case.'" The court identified the
Hazzard case as a valid precedent for the proposition that the indenture trustee
is more like a stakeholder than a traditional trustee. 42  At least one
commentator thought this decision was surprising and indicative of the court
departing from its own decision in Dabney."
Additionally, the court in Elliott Associates v. J. Henry Schroder Bank &
Trust Co. concluded that there is no implied duty under the TIA to secure
greater benefits for bondholders above the specific obligations mentioned in
the indenture.'" The court cited the Meckel case for the proposition that the
trustee is more like a stakeholder than a trustee, and also explicitly restricted
the holding in Dabney to cases in which the trustee has an evident conflict of
interest. 43
Clearly, the struggle for an accepted determination of the nature of the




13 Broadv. Rockwell, 614F.2d 418(5thCir. 1980), modifiedon othergroundsen banc, 642 F.2d
929.
1 See id.




143 See Sklar, supra note 121, at 55.




commentator concluded long ago that the indenture trustee cannot be
considered a mere stakeholder." The legislative history of the TIA indicates
that, at least after default, the highest fiduciary standard is required from the
trustee. 47 The legislative comment to the TIA explaining the standard of care
states that "[t]he standard provided for is substantially the same as that which
is applicable in the field of personal trusts."'4 On the other hand, to consider
the trustee as a traditional trustee would be equivalent to overestimating its
duties. 49 Even if the conclusion is that the obligation of the indenture lies
somewhere between a stakeholder and a trustee it is unsatisfactory as it leaves
too much room for uncertainty. It is not clear what qualifications of the
indenture trustee should be derived from the traditional trustee and what
should be derived from a stakeholder. Thus, bondholders will be confused as
to the obligations of the trustee towards them.
Hence, the nature of the indenture is not well defined, and probably
combines more than one legal relationship. As stressed above, the nature of
the relationships needs to be defined for very practical reasons as both the
bondholder and the trustee must know where they stand.
B. The Longest Legal Document
One of the most common complaints regarding a debenture indenture is
that it is an unmanageable, long and complex document. " Some have called
it a "Frankenstein monster," a product of the "excessive sophistication of Wall
Street," aimed at confusing the "straightforward and more honest
Westerner."'' As early as 1930, it was named "the largest of all legal
documents," and described as an agreement that mystifies young lawyers by
its "enormous size and myriad of covenants."'5 Robert Landau opens his
book with a milder observation and states "the corporate trust indenture is
undoubtedly one of the most involved financial documents that has been
devised."' 53 A more emotional reaction is of one commentator remarking, "it
is only a slight exaggeration to say that nobody loves an indenture."''"
146 See Posner, supra note 2, at 198.
147 See generally H.R. REP. No. 76-1016 (1939).
149 H.R. REP. No. 76-1016, at 55 (1939); see also Obrzut, supra note 41, at 141.
149 See Posner, supra note 2, at 198.
ISO See, e.g., Walter H. Brown, The Mortgage Bond Indenture Forns-1981, 36 Bus. LAw. 1017
(1981)
151 Ray Garret Jr., A Borrower's View of the Model Corporate Debenture Indenture Provisions,
21 Bus. LAw. 675, 675 (1966).
152 Draper, supra note 11, at 98.
15 LANDAU, supra note 63, at 7.
154 Garret, supra note 151, at 675.
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Indeed, an indenture is of considerable length, rather hard to read, and
getting worse. The mortgage agreement drafted in 1880 was almost twice as
long as its predecessor, executed in 1871.'"' In fact, it rapidly developed from
a modest real estate mortgage, without recitals or covenants to a contract of
enormous length. 56 This unpopular development is a result of the slow and
gradual evolvement of the indenture." 7 The practice has been, and still is, to
add new provisions or to elaborate old ones, without any attempt to prune
back those that are no longer relevant or are unnecessary for other reasons.'58
Whenever asked to draw an indenture, a lawyer would use a copy of a
previous indenture as a starting point, but would usually not erase any of the
provisions, knowing it would not cause any harm to leave them.'59 The lawyer
would then add some provisions or sentences of her/his own and make a
personal contribution to the document."W In this way, indenture agreements
became larger and larger.
One must acknowledge the relative vacuum created by the absence of
substantive legislation or consistent and fully developed jurisprudence. The
lack of defined duties and rights makes the contract, namely the indenture,
almost an exclusive source of those duties and rights. The comparison of
bondholders' rights to shareholders' rights emphasizes this point. As pointed
out by Ray Garret, a common stock issue can be created by a single sentence,
theoretically speaking. "6' Nevertheless, behind this sentence stands an array
of sources: the act under which the issuer was incorporated, the federal
securities laws, the rules of a national exchange and an important body of
judicial precedents. This cluster of law defines the shareholder's rights in a
relatively clear manner. On the other hand, the bondholder has nothing
comparable. Generally speaking, his rights derive mostly from the indenture.
The TIA speaks in terms of what should be included in an indenture for it to
qualify under the Act, rather than creating rights. 62 Therefore, an indenture
must be drafted carefully and precisely. From this point of view, an
indenture's length presents inconveniences and generates antagonism, yet
perhaps it should be accepted as a necessity.
1ss See Draper, supra note 11, at 90.
' See Churchill Rodgers, The Corporate Trust Indenture Project, 20 BUS. LAW. 551, 552-55
(1965).
157 See id.
139 See Draper, supra note 11, at 94.
139 See Rodgers, supra note 156, at 556.
160 See id.
161 See Garret, supra note 15 1, at 676.
162 See e.g., Trust Indenture Act of 1939 § 315(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(c) (1997).
THE INDENTURE TRUSTEE
Henry Drinker told an anecdote almost 75 years ago about a young lawyer
who was determined to compose a workable corporate mortgage. '63 His
intention was to create a document of ten to fifteen pages instead of the 150
pages found in his firm's files.' The result was that in complete frustration
he ended up with a mortgage of even greater length. 65
C. Model Indentures
In 1962, the American Bar Foundation (hereinafter "the ABF') announced
its plan to develop a model form of corporate debenture indenture." s The
basic objective of the Advisory Committee was to draft a simple language,
workable, and acceptable model. 67 The aspiration was to save lawyers and
corporations much effort and expense in the process of the transaction
underlying an indenture.' In 1965, the model debenture indenture was
published and since then its provisions have been widely used. 69 Later, in
1972, the ABF published commentaries on the model analyzing the
considerations underlying the Committee's determinations and explaining why
a particular form was adopted. 0 It also offered sample alternative provisions
that might be appropriate for special circumstances. 7'
One of the cornerstones of the model was the idea of incorporating
provisions by reference. 72 The Committee felt this would make the drafting
process much more simple and efficient. 73 However, the notion of
incorporation did not become a common practice "because of its
complexities."' 74




t See Rodgers, supra note 156, at 559.
167 See id
"' See id.
"6 Following this publication, the ABF also issued the Model Debenture Indenture Provisions.
AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, MODEL INDENTURE PROVISIONS-ALLREGISTERED ISSUES(1997). Although
the majority of new issues are offered in registered form, the text was substantially the same as the 1965
model, certainly for the purposes of this study.
'70 See generally AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, COMMENTARIES ON INDENTURES (1972).
171 See id.
17 See Rodgers. supra note 156, at 560.
173 See id.
74 LANDAU, supra note 63, at 49. The composers of the model recognized that "...lawyers may
prefer a consecutive statement of all the provisions.. without reference...," but they still hoped others would
adopt the incorporation by reference practice. See Rodgers, supra note 156. at 562.
1999]
66 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol.8:47
An important concept of the model was its division into two parts: the
preprinted standard provisions and the negotiated provisions.'"5 The latter was
expected to vary greatly from one transaction to the other, therefore, they were
left to party negotiation. 76 On the other hand, other provisions, many of them
conforming the transaction to the TIA, may be found with little variation in
every indenture. Thus, the outcome of the Committee's efforts was a two-part
form.'
77
The division into negotiable and non-negotiable provisions might play
some role in defending the interests of the bondholders by focusing the
negotiating parties on the most important issues, perhaps leading to more
demands in favor of the bondholders. Still, it is doubtful that any of the
parties would have the incentive to protect the bondholders' interests.
Moreover, the Committee's mere classification of provisions as non-
negotiable takes into account certain preferences regarding the interests of the
parties. Although the Committee stated that the selection was based on the
prevailing practice rather than upon any doctrinaire view, 17 it is nevertheless
questionable whether such decisions can be made in a truly unbiased manner.
During the drafting process, the Committee received suggestions and
comments from numerous experienced lawyers, corporations, and banks
nation-wide. 79  Many issuers, investors, and corporate trustees'
representatives participated in the meetings and discussions held by the
Committee. 80 "[W]ithout question, the model... has been exposed to the most
exhaustive, impartial review."' In other words, the Committee made a point
to hear and take into account the whole spectrum of interests involved in an
indenture. Of course, this can be seen from two different perspectives. From
one point of view, the involvement of so many experienced people, who
represented the different interests surrounding a typical trust indenture,
contributed to the elimination of many mistakes, ambiguities and
redundancies. However, from another point of view, it would be difficult to
deny that this spectrum of interests must have led to many compromises.
Although it was clearly important for the model's drafters that it be "as fair
and free from bias" as possible,'82 it seems this could not be an impartial
document. Any negotiation between parties generates compromises but the
75 See id. at 560.
176 See id.
17 See id. at 561.
178 See COMMENTARIES ON INDENTURES, supra note 171.
17 See Rodgers, supra note 156, at 562.
[s See id.
131 Ray. F. Myers, The Model Indenture, 104 TRS. & ESTS. 690,699 (1965).
132 Rodgers, supra note 156, at 568.
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question was whether it was wise to adopt compromises regardless of the
particular relations between the parties and the specific circumstances of each
negotiation. The model provisions were intended to be an exhibit attached to
an indenture and therefore it was possible to deviate from the model or omit
certain provisions.' Yet, if this is to be done, then we are back again at the
burdensome pre-model process of drafting an indenture, every lawyer omitting
and adding provisions, sentences or words to the model indenture, making it
longer and more complicated.
Moreover, as the issue of representing the bondholders themselves is
concerned, it seems that the model indenture did not take their interests into
full consideration. To be sure, investing banks and corporate trustees were
consulted with but, as will be argued later, it is at least doubtful that they were
capable of adequately representing bondholders' interests.
Although the ABF model attempted to simplify the complicated language
of the indenture, it did not succeed in this specific mission. The Committee's
chairman himself admitted that the outcome was a result of compromise." 4
It seems that the involved lawyers were unable to agree on refraining from the
use of perfect tenses and a very short sentenced version of the indenture was
rejected on the grounds that it was inaccurate, confusing, and unsatisfactory.
Chairman Churchill Rodgers acknowledged that the model is not free of
superfluous provisions." 5 It was also admitted that the removal of archaic
provisions were not significant. 6 Still, the fact that the model contained
seventy-five pages should be considered a significant accomplishment. The
initial boilerplate was composed of around 100 pages and dozens of lawyers
tried to contribute to this document. 87 Under these circumstances, it was
quite a success to end up with a document 25 percent shorter.
Even if the model did not achieve the desired standardization, it still plays
an important role by being used as a carefully considered standard of
comparison. This way, even those who do not use the model as a basis for
their indenture can refer to it in search of the appropriateness and adequacy
of any provision offered by other parties. 8 The detailed commentaries
offered by the model may be helpful to the drafters of any specific indenture,
since they explain and analyze many of the provisions.
In 1981, the ABF published another model, the Model Mortgage Bond
Indenture Form, which completed the objectives set by the ABF nineteen
19 See LANDAU, supra note 63, at 49.
194 See Rodgers, supra note 156, at 565.
19 See id.
18 See id. at 564-65.
19 See id. at 561.
In See id.
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years earlier." 9 This form is structured as one integrated document,
contrasted with the two-part model indenture. It departed from the model
indenture's use of the incorporation-by-reference technique. As mentioned
earlier, this technique, despite its theoretical virtues, did not achieve the
general acceptance that was expected. The technique's advantages have also
decreased with the growing use of "high speed, large-memory, word
processing computers.""
The Model Mortgage Bond Indenture Form also contains many footnotes
providing alternatives to the suggested text, as well as comments, explanations
and a cross-reference guide. This model was not what one considers a
breakthrough in language simplification. Nevertheless, it was a scholarly and
sophisticated effort, aimed to be of practical aid to drafters of indentures.
The next effort to contribute to the field was made in 1983, this time by the
American Bar Association's Committee on Developments in Business
Financing. This model was named the Model Simplified Indenture,
characterizing its modest length (only thirty-one pages) and its use of "plain
English."'' The American Bar Association's Committee declared its desire
to make the indenture provisions more comprehensible for the benefit of
bondholders, the indenture trustee's personnel, and issuers' officers."
The simplified model, unlike the first ABF model, took the position that
nearly all the provisions in the indenture are subject to negotiation at least to
some degree. It still attempts to suggest an agreeable language to the main
provisions and notes that there are some provisions required by the TIA,
which are of course non-negotiable. 93  Some of the achievement of
shortening the indenture should be attributed to the fact that the simplified
model uses a method of incorporating the TIA by reference. The TIA does not
prohibit such incorporation. Moreover, the TIA overrides conflicting
provisions in indentures in case they are any. Therefore, the incorporation of
the TIA does not affect any of the parties' interests and so it seems like an
efficient technique.
Both the first ABF model and the simplified model adopted the limited
duties imposed on the trustee under a permissive provision of the TIA on the
pre-default situation.'94 In other words, both models require the trustee to
'' See AMERIcAN BAR FOUNDATION, MODEL MORTGAGE BOND INDENTuRE (1981); see also
LANDAU, supra note 63, at 49.
190 Brown, supra note 150, at 1919.
19" AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, Model Simplified Indenture, 38 BUS. LAw. 741 (1983). The
simplified model was prepared for an unsecured convertible subordinated debt.
292 See id.
,'3 See id at 742.
'94 See Trust Indenture Act of 1939 § 315(a)(1). IS U.S.C. § 77ooo(a)(I) (1997).
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perform only those duties that are explicitly mentioned in the indenture.
However, the ABF model deliberately omitted the provision that exempt the
trustee from liability for actions taken in good faith, which the trustee believed
were authorized or within its powers.'95 The explanation for this omission is
that it is unnecessary in light of the overriding provisions of the TIA in matters
of the trustee's negligence. The drafters also thought that such an exemption
might encourage trustees "to act on the basis of its own good faith and belief
rather than on the basis of legal advise."'96 In contrast, the simplified model
adopted an additional immunity clause, arguing it will in fact encourage the
trustee to act in questionable circumstances instead of refraining from action
in an attempt to avoid liability.' 97 Of course, in any case, this provision is
subject to the TIA.' Thus, the approach of these models only attempts to
encourage the trustee to act in a certain way and not to change the trustee's
legal obligations under the TIA.
In other matters concerning the trustee, it seems that the simplified model
and the ABF' s model agree. The trustee's duties-and-rights provisions use the
same language in both models." The trustee is also exempted in both models
from responsibility for the issue and the obligations of the company with
regard to the debt features.2' In Browning Debenture Holders' Committee v.
DASA Corp., the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decided that the trustee had
no duty to communicate an opinion regarding the fairness of a reduction in the
bonds' conversion price to bondholders.201 The management proposed this
offer, which put the bondholders in a better position, in order to encourage
them to agree to an amendment of the indenture.2'2 The conclusion that the
trustee had no duty to monitor the company's compliance with the terms of the
conversion privilege conforms with the disclaimer articulated in the models.
As to the question of conflicts of interest, both models take the same view
that the trustee may deal with the issuing company and become the owner or
pledgee of the bonds.203 Not surprisingly, the provisions dealing with conflict
195 See COMMENTARIES ON INDENTURES, supra note 1 71. at 258.
196 Id.
197 See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, Model Simplified Indenture, 38 BUS. LAW. 741 § 7.01(c)
(1983)
19 See 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(d).
199 See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, Model Simplified Indenture, 38 BUS. LAW. 741 § 10.17
(1983) and AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, Sample Incorporating Indenture, MODEL DEBENTURE
INDENTURE PROVISIONS § 604 (1965).
2W See id.
201 Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078, 1083 (2d Cir. 1977).
22 See id.
2 See AMERICANBARASSOCIATION. ModelSinmplifiedlndenture, 38 Bus. LAW. 741 §7.03(1983)
and AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, Sample Incorporating Indenture, MODEL DEBENTURE INDENTURE
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of interest issues in the models are taken from Section 310(b) of the TIA
almost word-by-word. Of course, those provisions are mandatory and regulate
the situation whether or not they are incorporated into the indenture.2"4 Still,
the TIA set the minimum standard and indentures could theoretically adopt
provisions that better the bondholders' position. Notice though, that the
models' drafters did not point out any additional situations in which conflicts
of interest interfere with the relationship between the bondholders and the
trustee. Nor did they find any reason to improve the bondholders' position in
any other way, such as a shortened waiting period of ninety days in which the
trustee must eliminate those conflicts or resign."° s None of the official parties
of the indenture would want to support such voluntary additions as it might
inconveniently lead to the termination of relations or accelerate the
termination of relations. Only the silent participant in the indenture, the
bondholders, might have an opposite interest in this respect. The bondholders
might argue that other situations consist of conflicting interests, or, in certain
situations, that the waiting period is too long. Still, the bondholders remained
silent while these models were drafted. Therefore, the outcome is that both
models do not offer the bondholders any improvement in their position as
compared to the protection offered in the TIA.
There is no question that the models that were suggested over the years
have contributed to the developments in this field. o Admittedly, the modem
day indenture is not simple and not as standardized as was hoped for. This
may be unavoidable due to the fact that this document is a product of lawyers.
One commentator said that the indenture draftsmen are often "strong-willed
individuals" who may not be satisfied with a ihodel.' Those involved in the
drafting of indentures often feel a strong need to add to the boilerplate.
Moreover, it should be kept in mind that an indenture is subject to many
conflicting interests held by at least four parties: the issuer, the underwriter,
the trustee, and the bondholders. Surely this contributes to both the length and
the verbose sentence structure of the models.
D. The Interests of the Indenture's Parties
At the foundation of the drafting process of an indenture are the conflicting
needs of the parties involved, and therefore the conflicting interests of the
PROVISIONS § 605 (1965).
M4 See Trust Indenture Act of 1939 § 310(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77jjj(b) (1997).
2M See id § 77jiW.
M6 Robert Landau further mentions another model, the Sample Uncertified Debt Indenture, offered
by the ABA in 1991. See LANDAU, supra note 63, at 50.
W Brown, supra note 150, at 1921.
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parties. Issuers insist on maximizing their freedom from burdensome financial
and procedural restrictions. In most cases, if not all, they see the indenture as
a necessity imposed by law and not as an instrument to create certain business
relations. They surely do not treat it as they would treat a regular loan
agreement or other private debt. Probably, the issuers regard the indenture as
an administrative requirement part of the issuance and underwriting
agreement. Since most of the financial conditions and definitions are
discussed primarily with the underwriter, the only real interest of the issuer in
the indenture is to minimize the administrative burden. In fact, the issuer and
the underwriter probably conclude all the financial terms of the bonds before
the trustee even enters the picture. The issuer reluctantly agrees to the
trustee's role in this relationship and wants the trustee to remain as passive as
possible. Seemingly, the trustee's involvement is a burden the issuer must
bear, and therefore the issuer strives to minimize such involvement.
The issuer is also the one who formally hires and pays the trustee, since he
is the one responsible for qualifying the bond issuance with the TIA.208 This
fact is of great significance. Surely, the character of the relationship in the
19th Century was not one in which the issuer hired the trustee. The TIA itself
does not explicitly create such a relationship, but it probably did so
unintentionally by making the issuer responsible for the appointment of a
trustee in certain issuance scenarios. The trustee is supposed to give services,
if at all, to the bondholders, not to the issuer. In sum, not only are the issuer's
interests in the indenture focused upon minimizing the supervising power of
* the trustee, but the structure of the relationship between the issuer and the
trustee are distorted and do not serve the bondholders interests.
The underwriter's interests in the indenture are somewhat ambiguous.
From one viewpoint, the underwriter acts as a supposed partner of the issuer
-it makes suggestions and recommendations and advises the issuer as to
market conditions. In this respect, the underwriter is not only a partner to the
issuer, but also a partner to the issuance. Arguably, its main interest is that the
securities will be marketable. Therefore, the underwriter's principal concern
is that the terms of the bonds and the indenture are within the range sufficient
to ensure marketability.2' Thus, the underwriter might be willing to consider
the bondholders' interests as far as they coincide with the ultimate goal - to
sell those bonds (or to willingly hold them). The conclusion might be that the
bonds' attractiveness in the market is the key to the underwriter's course of
action.
2M See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77eee(a)(1).
29 See David B. Simpson, The Drafting of Loan Agreements: A Borrower's Viewpoint, 28 Bus.
LAw. 1161, 1162 (1973).
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In contrast, the reality is that in many cases the underwriter is actually
holding some of the bonds--either willingly as a chosen investment or
unwillingly as a result of poor marketability of those bonds.210 There is a
possibility that the underwriter will not be able to sell those bonds to the
public, at least not in the near future. This possibility, even when remote,
makes the marketability element more "close to home." Thus, it arguably puts
the underwriter in the position of having specific interests similar, if not
identical, to those of the other prospective bondholders. In addition, there is
the issue of the underwriter's reputation. The nature of the securities market
induces much reliance on reputation of the involved players. The very ability
of the underwriter to sell the securities may depend upon reputation. If losses
to bondholders occur repeatedly, the underwriter's position in the market
could deteriorate dramatically and mercilessly. This is especially the case
when the underwriter must satisfy institutional investors who commonly
participate in many bond issues. These investors are, for the most part, more
sophisticated and professional than the average individual investor.
Therefore, in order to attract these institutional investors the underwriter must
promote an indenture that fits their expectations.2 '
It has been asserted that at least some underwriters feel responsible for the
prospective bondholder. Robert Landau acknowledges that the leading
investment houses feel "some moral responsibility," but even he stresses that
the primary concern of the underwriter is the marketability of the bonds.2" 2
Even if some underwriters feel in any way obliged to the bondholders, "the
law can hardly leave investors subject to the doubtful protection of private
consciences." 2t3
In formulating the TIA, Congress concluded that one of the main
disadvantages to bondholders is the absence of representation in the
indenture's drafting process.21 4 Yet, even after the TIA was enacted, neither
the issuer nor the underwriter provides sufficient representation to
bondholders. It must be understood that even the SEC and other agencies do
not represent bondholders. The SEC probably relies on the TIA's provisions
to protect bondholders and focuses on the technical inquiry of the indenture's
compatibility with the TIA. This, however, does not adequately protect the
interests of bondholders.
210 See Benjamin Wham, Trustees Under indentures, 23 A.B.A. J. 179, 181 (1937).
211 See Garret, supra note 151. at 682.
212 LANDAU, supra note 63, at 79.
213 George E. Palmer, Trusteeship Underthe Trust Indenture, 41 COLUM. L REv. 193,213(1941).
214 See Trust Indenture Act of 1939 § 302(a)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 77bbb(a)(6) (1997).
THE INDENTURE TRUSTEE
Perhaps the most obvious candidate to be the bondholders' guardian is the
trustee. Regrettably, while constructed to protect the bondholders,2"5 not even
the trustee has a strong incentive to protect bondholders during negotiations.
In fact, it would be more reasonable to assume that its only interest in this
stage is its own protection from liability.21 6 This truth is precisely what
inspired passage of the TIA in the first place. Thus, the TIA itself was
supposed to be the investor's silent representative in the drafting process of
the indenture.21
Even if the TIA did not have flaws, it would still be unwise to totally rely
on it at the negotiation stage. This is the contractual point where the
bondholders could be at their most powerful position, yet they seem to suffer
their worst vulnerability. One should not forget that the whole transaction is
constructed so that the bondholders will lend money to the issuer. Therefore,
it seems reasonable to expect the bondholders to have an advantageous
position before they actually lend their money to the issuer. However,
somehow, in the end, bondholders are left with a lack of adequate
representation, which results in an indenture that does not seem to protect
them any more than the TIA dictates. The TIA is only supposed to offer a
safety net or minimal protection to bondholders. Although this should not
prevent them from achieving better indenture terms, the lack of representation
at the negotiation stage does not allow them to do so. In fact, bondholders are
effectively prevented from participating in the negotiation of an indenture
either directly or indirectly.
Despite the described situation, courts usually characterize indentures as
a contract between the issuer and the bondholders asserting that "the
connotation is that of a bargained agreement. ' '21 Consequently, courts tend
to deny relief to bondholders if their indenture does not provide the protection
they claim. 219 Yet, as argued above, indentures are not bargained for with the
bondholders nor is it a product of negotiation. As one court finally
acknowledged, "indentures are often not the product of face-to-face
negotiations between the ultimate holders and the issuing company... [T]he
underwriters ordinarily negotiate the terms of the indentures with the
issuers. 220
215 See generally H.R. REP. No. 76-1016 (1939).
216 See Obrzut, supra note 41, at 135.
217 See id.
218 Martin Riger, The Trust IndentureAsBargained Contract: The Persistence of Myth, 16J. CORP.
L 211,214 (1991).
219 See, e.g., Elliott Assocs. v. J. Henry Schroder Bank & Trust Co., 655 F. Supp. 1281, 1288-89
(S.D.N.Y. 1987).
Vo Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1509 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
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Robert Landau suggests that a number of factors have "substantially
resolved this problem."'" Among them, he notes the increasing influence of
institutional investors, the minimum standards of the TIA, the disclosure
provision of the 1933 Act, the regulatory powers of the SEC and the patterns
of typical indentures.' As shown above, these factors are important but still
unsatisfactorily protect bondholders during indenture negotiations. While an
indenture is a contract binding on the issuer, the trustee, and the bondholders,
no party bargains for the rights and protections of the bondholders.
V. THE PRE-DEFAULT ROLE OF THE TRUSTEE
Most commentators believe that an indenture trustee basically acts in a
ministerial role before default has occurred.' The TIA itself seems to take
that position especially after the TIRA.' One significant example of that
attitude is the fact that a trustee, who is also a creditor of the issuer, is not
prohibited from acting as a trustee until there is a default. 5 This implies that
the existence of a conflict of interest in the pre-default situation is not harmful.
The conclusion must be that the trustee's role prior to default is merely
technical. In addition, under at least some court rulings, trustee duties prior to
default are mainly contractual.' 2 It has also been said that even the SEC
position is consistent with this notion.227 The SEC's view, as presented in a
memorandum supporting the TIRA legislation, was that in the absence of
default, trustee duties are essentially ministerial.228
In this section, the pre-default role of the trustee will be examined. It will
be argued that although some of the duties the trustee bears are merely
technical, they - along with more substantive duties - reflect an important and
substantial role. From the borrower's point of view, even the technical tasks
of the trustee were designed as part of a scheme to protect his rights. As such,
not only is the importance of such duties underestimated but so is the question
of conflicts of interest in the pre-default situation.
221 LANDAU, supra note 63, at 79.
2n See id.
U3 See, e.g. Friedman, supra note 67, at 345, and Stewart M. Robertson, Debenture Holders and
the Indenture Trutee: Controlling Managerial Discretion in the Solvent Enterprise, 11 HARV. J. L &
PUB. POL'Y 461,479 (1988).
2U See Trustee Indenture Act of 1939 § 310(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77jj(b) (1997).
223 See id. § 77jjj(10).
n6 See, e.g., Meckel v. Continental Resources Co., 758 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1985).




A. The Negotiation Stage
As described above, the initial stage of preparing an indenture is very
important from the bondholders' point of view since it is the indenture that
sets out the obligations and rights of the parties involved. 9 The trustee, while
primarily concerned with its own interests, is probably the most appropriate
party to protect the bondholders' interests at this stage.23° Unfortunately, the
lack of guidance in the TIA and the fact that the investors are not yet "actual"
individuals, culminates in most cases to indifferent behavior on the side of the
trustee. Moreover, the issuer, sometimes upon the advice of an investment
bank or underwriter, usually selects the trustee. Therefore, at this stage the
trustee does not feel obliged to the bondholders nor does it have a sense of
representing them. It is also not uncommon that the appointment of the trustee
takes place almost at the last minute - sometimes only days before closing.
This leaves a very narrow timeframe for the trustee to conduct any negotiation
for the benefit of the prospective bondholders, if at all. Although the TIA is
designed to set minimum standards for the protection of bondholders, it is
clear that each issue might be somewhat different and there is always room for
negotiation and improvement of the bondholders' position. However, in most
cases, there is no actual negotiation regarding bondholder rights. The
situation is regrettable not only because bondholder rights might be at stake
but also because the trustee itself might be put in a disadvantageous position
during the life of the indenture. Although the trustee has no responsibility for
the substantive financial provisions of the indenture, it will have to administer
the agreement.23' Therefore, it should be interested in negotiating for
provisions that will make its role easier as it confronts problems.
Although negotiating the financial terms of bonds is not one of the
trustee's responsibilities, much could be done to improve the bondholders'
position. Robert Landau mentions certain procedures that a trustee should
follow when reviewing the terms of an indenture.232 Thus, a trustee should act
to eliminate uncertainty and ambiguity from the indenture.233 For example, it
should compare the provisions of the bond itself with the indenture's
provisions since in case of conflict the former controls. Another example is
the assurance that nothing in the indenture contradicts the TIA. These
examinations are for the benefit of bondholders both at the stage when
2" See discussion supra Part IV(D).
2W See id.
23 See, e.g., Trust Indenture Act of 1939 § 315(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(b) (1997).
232 See LANDAU, supra note 63, at 81.
2 See id.
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investors decide to purchase the bonds and in later developments when the
indenture needs to be interpreted by a court. Also, if the bonds are secured,
the trustee should give particular attention to the provisions of the indenture
that deal with security as this is the bondholders' guarantee that all the details
concerning collateral are covered satisfactorily.2"
B. Routine Responsibilities
The duties of a trustee prior to default, as defined in Section 315 (a)(1) of
the TIA, are only those that are specifically noted in the indenture. 23S In other
words, according to the TIA implied duties do not exist in an indenture. Of
course, theoretically speaking, an indenture could add to the specific
responsibilities of the trustee that are set by the TIA. But as could be
presumed, such additional duties are rarely provided, if ever. Thus, a trustee's
duties are not broad and are almost always confined to what is specifically
mentioned in the TIA.
Moreover, in accordance with Section 3 15(a)(1) of the TIA, an indenture
may provide that the trustee need not make any independent investigation of
statements or opinions furnished in conformity with the requirements of the
indenture.236 This provision further emphasizes the notion that trustee duties
are restricted and technical in nature.
Section 314(4) of the TIA requires that the obligor file certain reports with
the trustee as evidence of compliance with the provisions of the indenture.237
In the absence of bad faith, trustees may "conclusively" rely on such
statements as if they are true.238 Still, in order to prevent a trustee from
serving as a mere "mechanical bookkeeping agent,"2 39 the provision requires
that the trustee "shall examine the evidence furnished to it.. .to determine
whether or not such evidence conforms to the requirements of the
indenture."' Thus, a trustee must make sure that there is no evidence
indicating a violation of the indenture.'"
Another responsibility of a trustee is to transmit reports to the bondholders
at least once a year.242 Section 313 of the TIA sets out all the incidents in
U4 See id.
2M See 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(a)(1).
2M See Friedman, supra note 67, at 346.
237 See 15 U.S.C. § 77nnn(4).
2M See id.
29 Friedman, supra note 67, at 345.
M' 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(a).
241 See Campbell & Zack, supra note 103, at 1713.
242 See 15 U.S.C. § 77mmm.
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which such a report is required including any change in the trustee's eligibility
status and any advance the trustee made in connection with the bonds. 24 The
report is only required at the occurrence of one of the events enumerated in
Section 313(a).'
Although the language, and in certain points the silence, of the Act
certainly corresponds with the view that the pre-default duties of the trustee
are minimal, it is nevertheless implied and supported by the legislative history
of the Act that the trustee is expected to act in some circumstances.245 The
rationale behind refraining from specifying trustee duties is that neither the
Act nor an indenture is capable of giving a recipe for the trustee's conduct in
any specific event or condition, as it all depends on particular circumstances.
Still, one should acknowledge the tension between the expectation that the
trustee will act and react as necessary and the language of Section 315
maintaining that only explicit duties will be enforced. For example, it is
acceptable that a trustee should attempt to ensure that notice of any exchange
offer or debt reconstruction is reasonable and complete in light of the facts
known so that the bondholders can make an informed investment decision.2
But it is also agreed that a trustee is not an investment advisor, unless it
explicitly undertakes this role. Arguably, if the trustee acts in good faith and
conforms with the indenture terms, his behavior will be endorsed by courts,
whether passive or active. But notice that due to Section 314(4), it is easier
for trustees to rely on the obligor's statements, for example, then to disregard
them. Although a court endorsed a trustee's discretion to disregard an
obligor's statement in Cruden v. Bank of New York,' 7 the language of the Act
leaves little room to positively require the trustee to use discretion with regard
to the obligor's report. In Cruden, the trustee was permitted to rely on his
counsel's opinion, although that opinion turned out to be wrong."4 While the
plaintiffs contended there was lack of evidence that the trustee had examined
and relied upon a counsel's opinion in good faith, the court concluded that
there was no evidence of bad faith.' 9 The court held that the trustee and the
counsel showed "discussion and work between them" and there was no
evidence of "lawyer shopping" in an attempt to secure a favorable opinion of
counsel.2 °
23 See id.
2 Id. § 77mmm(a).
25 See discussion supra Part I.
M See Barbara Hewson & Jane Hetherington, The Relationship Between Bondholders and the
Indenture Trustee, 387 PLUREAL 633 (1993).
U 957 F.2d 961 (2d Cir. 1992).
, See id. at 965.
U9 See id.
M Id.;see also BrowningDebentureHoldersComm. v. DASACorp., 560F.2d 1078 (2d Cir. 1977)
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C. The Standard of Care
The standard of care required from a trustee prior to default can be
characterized as that of negligence: a trustee can be found liable for actions
it conducted and omissions to act only if it was negligent. This view is
supported by Section 315(d) of the TIA, according to which a trustee cannot
be relieved from liability for its own negligence.2"' Section 315(d)(2) assures
that a trustee is protected from "any error of judgment made in good faith by
a responsible officer..., unless it shall be proved that such trustee was
negligent in ascertaining the pertinent facts."252 After the TIRA, this provision
is included in any indenture unless explicitly excluded.253
Section 315 was designed to overcome the vast immunities from liability
trustees commonly included in indentures.2  Ironically, Section 315(d)(1)
also allows a trustee to avoid liability prior to default in many other situations
through Section 315(a), which is an exception under Section 315(d).2 5
Section 315(a) states that a trustee is only responsible for explicit duties and
that it may rely on the obligor's statements, as long as the trustee acts in good
faith.256 Therefore, a trustee will not be liable in cases where it negligently
failed to act, but the action was not expressly required by the indenture.
Consequently, the TIA does not really protect bondholders against a negligent
trustee.
Section 302(a)(2) of the TIA reiterates the described tension. On the one
hand, it notes that the interests of investors will be adversely affected "when
the trustee does not have adequate rights and.. .duties" and that investors may
reasonably assume "that the trustee is under an affirmative duty to take action
for the protection and enforcement of their rights. 257 On the other hand, it is
acknowledged that trust indentures "generally provide that the trustee shall be
under no duty to take any [affirmative] action... unless it receives notice of
default, demand for action, and indemnity," from the majority of
(trustee's duties limited to those specifically set forth in the indenture).




25 Although theoretically the indenture may expressly provide that Sections 315(a)(1) and 315(a)(2)
of the TIA are excluded, it is unlikely to happen due to the disadvantageous position of bondholders during
the negotiation stage.
2. See 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(a).
2 Id. § 77ccc(aX2).
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bondholders.58 Moreover, an indenture "generally relieves the trustee from
liability even for its own negligent action or failure to act."2 9
Therefore, the standard of care required from the trustee prior to default is
actually less than negligence. It seems that only acts or failures-to-act
conducted in bad faith could lead to trustee liability.
The structure of the TIA, together with the fact that only default activates
a passive trustee, is problematic. While making it difficult to find a trustee
liable for a failure to act in the pre-default period, the structure has even more
severe consequences where bondholders are concerned. The Act creates a
significant obstacle to a trustee's perceived responsibility to discover defaults
before they occur.
When default occurs, it is in many occasions too late for bondholders to
save their investment. This is certainly true when the bonds are unsecured.
But even secured bonds usually do not guarantee return on the investment
since the value of property rapidly deteriorates once the owner defaults. Also,
secured creditors are not entitled to compensation for delay caused by an
automatic stay in foreclosing on collateral when the claim is under-secured. 2
Indeed, the notice of default usually means that bondholders are in the worst
possible financial position. Creditors of the obligor, most of them with
secured loans or having other priority over the bondholders, are acting
forcefully even before the first bondholder committee is convened. It is only
prior to default that bondholder investment could still be saved with vigorous
intervention. Prior to default, bondholders can negotiate with the obligor for
terms that will make them better off, in case default does occur. Once default
notice has been served, bondholders are placed in the position of having
nothing to lose. Occasionally, the obligor's officers will take advantage of
that position in order to achieve legally binding concessions from
bondholders. Therefore, the importance of an early detection of default cannot
be overstated.
Yet a trustee is not encouraged by either the TIA or the indenture to do
anything that could lead to such early discovery of a possible default. It
allows a trustee to rely on statements by the obligor, with minimal
requirements of investigation that could lead to the discovery of impending
default.26 In the case of Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust, the obligor
was under the duty to maintain a ratio of assets to liabilities of 200 percent at
258 Id.
25 Id.
260 See United Sav. Ass'n of Texas, Ltd. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs. Ltd.. 484 U.S. 365,
375 (1988).
261 See 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(a).
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all times and it submitted certifications to that effect. 2 If Section 315(a)
means that the trustee shall accept this statement without question, there is no
doubt the bondholders are in potential trouble. Admittedly, a passive trustee
is not equipped - through either the TIA or the indentures - to police
compliance with the complex covenants commonly used in indentures which
are designed to protect bondholders. 3
Furthermore, the TIA's division of a trustee's role between passive pre-
default and active post-default creates another problem. Since upon default
a trustee's duties increase, the question is whether the trustee becomes
absolutely liable under a higher degree of care as default occurs, and what
shall be the consequences of a default occurring without the trustee's
knowledge or reasonable awareness. Defining default as occurring only after
the trustee is notified commonly solves this problem. '  Thus, in practice,
there is almost no situation in which default can occur without the trustee's
knowledge.
D. Controlling Managerial Discretion
Following the problematic issue of discovering default before it occurs, the
question arises of whether it is at all possible. More precisely, is it possible
to supervise an obligor's conduct and managerial decision-making process?
Should the management of an obligor inform bondholders of managerial
moves or allow any interventions, and if so, to what extent? Finally, does the
obligor's management owe any fiduciary obligations to bondholders?
In order to answer these questions, the nature of the relationship between
bondholders and obligors should be compared with the relationship of obligors
with shareholders. While both bondholders and shareholders supply obligors
with capital, their interests can be adverse. Bondholders have a fixed claim
on the obligor's assets, set at specific times, and shareholders have only an
unfixed residual claim.265 Although shareholders might earn a dividend, they
are not entitled to it and must totally rely on the management in that respect."z
Their rights are also subordinate to the prior rights of creditors.267 These
262 Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust, 439 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1971).
us See Friedman, supra note 67, at 348.
2U See AMEICAN BAR FOUNDATION, Sample Incorporating Indenture, MODEL DEBENTURE
INDENTURE PROVISIONS § 601(a)(2) (1965) (requires notice to the trustee in order for default to occur in
all cases, except for failure to pay principle or interest, bankruptcy, or similar proceeding involving the
obligor).
U5 See Corey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and the Corporate Governance, 41 Bus. LAW. 413,418
(1986).
H6 See Robertson, supra note 223, at 463.
267 See McDaniel, supra note 265.
THE INDENTURE TRUSTEE
major differences between bondholders and shareholders lead to two
important observations. First, bondholders, as creditors, have the right to
force the obligor into bankruptcy upon default.2 Shareholders have no such
right. Second, shareholders' reliance on management is so broad that
management is charged with a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the
shareholders.269 No fiduciary duty as such is owed to creditors.
The duty of management to shareholders might lead to a direct clash of
interests between shareholders and bondholders.27°  In fact, the
implementation of that duty occasionally causes management to engage in
strategies that will benefit shareholders at the expense of bondholders.271 For
example, management can decide to enter into a high-risk project, presuming
success will benefit shareholders while failure will not harm them. In fact,
shareholders prefer riskier strategies that will lead to higher dividends.272 In
contrast, such risky moves are clearly against bondholder interests, as it might
increase the number of creditors with a higher priority, raise the cost of capital
for the corporation, and eventually might lead to default. 273 Therefore, this
strategy might lessen the probability that bondholders will be able to recover
from the issuer assets. Generally speaking, bondholders prefer that earnings
will be reasonable while the company pursues a conservative business strategy
"which would maximize the likelihood that the corporation will have
sufficient funds to repay its debts. '' 274 As rational bondholders realize the
danger that lies in the pursuit for larger dividends, they might seek to control
managerial discretion.275
Surely, the initial and more natural way of attaining such control of
managerial performance would be within a contractual relationship, namely,
" See Robertson, supra note 223, at 463
26 See George Corey et aL,Are Bondholders Owed a Fiduciary Duty?, 18 FLA. ST. U. L REV. 971
(1991).
2 The word "management" in this section includes both the board of directors and the
corporation's officers. Although there may be subtle distinctions between the duties of corporate directors
and officers, they are not significant for the purposes of this paper. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Fairness
Rights of Corporate Bondholders, 65 N.Y.U. L RE.. 1165, 1168 n.8 (1990).
See Robertson, supra note 223, at 463; see also Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckeling,
Theory of The Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Cost and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305
(1976); Wn..AM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 255-63 (5th
ed. 1993); David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L REv. 1565
(1991); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CI. L
REV. 89 (1985).
zn See Corey, supra note 269, at 974.
M See id.
274 Kahan & Klausner, supra note 10, at 938.
273 See Robertson, supra note 223, at 463.
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the indenture. Typically, bondholders wish to constrain three possible
activities.
The first activity is the distribution of dividends to shareholders, which
from the bondholder point of view, is a mere reduction of the obligor's assets.
This danger is usually addressed by including in the indenture limitations on
the management's ability to make cash distributions. Since it can be relatively
easy to define, this constraint is also the most effective one. Many indentures
provide that cash dividends can only be made from a specific pool of funds
that represent superfluous profit. 6 Since dividend restrictions are relatively
easy to define, and since the process of paying cash dividends is controlled by
certain regulations, the limitation on obligor' s management is not complicated.
Nevertheless, such restrictions are not as common as they are in standard loan
agreements.277 For example, restricted payments covenants, which limit
dividends and stock repurchases, are found in over 90 percent of private loan
agreements, but in only 20 to 50 percent of public bond indentures.27
The second management strategy that bondholders fear is debt dilution.2 9
Management may weaken present creditor claims by issuing subsequent senior
debt.280 Most investors deal with that risk by including a negative pledge
clause in the indenture. 28' Negative pledge covenants range from total
prohibition on subsequent borrowing to detailed prohibitions on every
mortgage, lien, charge or encumbrance, with specific inclusions and
exclusions.2 2 Another possibility is to restrict the amount of the outstanding
debt of the issuer. 3 Since the issuer's interest is to have flexibility in its
practice, the scope of negative pledge covenants depends on the negotiation
process. A survey conducted in 1984 indicated that 82 out of 100 companies
had negative pledge clauses in their indentures.2"
It is still difficult and costly to monitor issuer indebtedness. Although the
financial statements are available to the public, a close and strict supervision
on management is needed to effectively prevent the issuer from creating senior
debt. In addition, it would not be practical for individual bondholders to
monitor the creation of senior debt. Therefore, a trustee should conduct such
monitoring. Yet no specific provisions in indentures provide for such
disruptive activity on the side of the trustee. But even if we assume a negative
276 See id. at 466.
27 See Anihud, supra note 74, at 463.
rt' See id.
27" See, e.g., Corey, supra note 269, at 974.
29 See Robertson, supra note 223, at 466.
291 See id. at 467.
M See COMMENTARIES ON INDENTURES, supra note 171, at 351.
2M See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 223, at 467.
2M See McDaniel, supra note 265, at 425.
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pledge clause is enforced against management, it must be recognized that its
scope may not be sufficient. In other words, a typical negative pledge clause
will probably not cover all the possible ways of diluting the value of
bondholder claims. The ABF Commentaries on Model Indenture points out
some alternative dilution methods. For example, the effect of a prior lien may
be achieved if a company sells and leases back any real property (with or
without repurchase agreement). The party who bought the property has an
interest in it prior to any unsecured rights of bondholders.285 Another example
is priority of a subsidiary's property. Debt issued by a subsidiary of an
obligor generates a claim against the assets of the subsidiary that is prior to the
equity claims of the parent corporation.2"' Although almost all the familiar
dilution methods can be addressed in the indenture, it is not only complicated
and costly but is also not very likely to happen due to the position of the
bondholders in the negotiation process.
Secured debt might solve the problem of monitoring issuer debt, since then
one would only need to monitor transactions made with respect to secured
assets. As this might be true, the influence of the interest rate should be taken
into consideration. Bondholders who insist on secured debt undertake lower
risk and therefore their compensation is reflected in lower interest rates. This
price, however, might be too high for certain investors and does not
necessarily present an adequate solution to the issue of debt dilution. In fact,
although ex-post priority of secured creditors affects the ex-ante perspective
of unsecured creditors, only fairness concerns are minimized and not
efficiency concerns.287 Thus, unsecured creditors will tend to refrain from
monitoring management or terminating on default."'8 In addition, a secured
creditor, who is supposed to monitor an obligor's misbehavior, might refrain
from doing so "because its collateral is entirely dissipated, although other
assets can still be salvaged."28 9 Therefore, the fact that debt could be secured
does not completely address the problems of managerial misbehavior.
Still, trying to prevent the dilution of bondholder claims can be more
manageable than attempting to tamper with the risk profile of an issuer.2 In
entering a high-risk activity, issuers favor shareholders at the expense of
bondholders. When bondholders fix the terms of their debt, those terms
reflect a certain risk of the business. A subsequent increase in the risk of an
25 See COMMENTARIES ON INDENTURES, supra note 1 71, at 355.
2 See id. at 357.
2s See F.H. Buckley, The Termination Decision, 61 UMKC L RE'. 243, 245 (1991).
290 See id. at 287.
n9 Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE i.
49, 58 (1982).
290 See Robertson, supra note 223, at 467.
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issuer actually decreases the funds from which bondholder claims can be
obtained. Monitoring the risk level of management decisions, the projects
management enters into, and the new debt management undertakes is not only
extremely costly, but also virtually impracticable. One would probably need
to sit in on every board of directors meeting. So even assuming a risky
decision will be identified, it will probably be followed by legal proceedings.
The interpretation of such a provision calling for such monitoring in a court
would be very difficult. Furthermore, it would be absurd to bring a suit on
every managerial decision that seems risky. In fact, bondholders would
probably be better off without a contractual provision attempting to restrict
risky conduct. As with every contractual provision, such a provision might
harm bondholders in cases of unforeseen circumstances. If no such provision
exists, a court might treat their interests more favorably, as it will not be
limited by the indenture's language. Additionally, although theoretically
possible, it would be extremely difficult to amend an indenture after unwanted
conduct of management has been detected. Naturally, such amendments are
hard to achieve in even normal relationships where the parties are able to
represent their interests adequately. It would be even more difficult in light of
the disadvantageous position bondholders find themselves in during the
negotiation and drafting of an indenture agreement.
Indeed, one of the indicators that management does not seem to be truly
restricted by an indenture's provisions or by bondholder interest is the
downgrading of bond ratings.29' These downgrades reflect the increased risk
those firms bear.292 In 1986, Standard & Poor's rating agency downgraded
364 corporate debt issues while upgrading only 149.293 Thus, bondholders are
forced to bear higher risk than they were willing to at the time they initially
invested their money.
The conclusion should be that indentures, as a contractual tool determining
bondholder rights, do not provide bondholders sufficient protection against
transfers of wealth to stockholders. As indicated in a report issued by Fortune
magazine in 1984, the trend in the market is away from including too many
restrictions in bonds. 29 It was suggested that the retreat from bond covenants
could be attributed to the long life of issues and the difficulty of amending
indentures.295 One commentator stated that indentures "[do] not and cannot
29 See id. at 471.
M See ii
293 See id.
294 See FORTUNE, Apr. 29, 1985, at 266. The exception to this trend is the "negative pledge clause"
which is still used by senior debtholders.
2" See Corey, supra note 269, at 976.
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protect bondholders."2" According to his view, changes in the bond market
in the last decades, such as enormous market growth, modem takeover
atmosphere and lower-quality issues, emphasizes the need for further
protection to bondholders. Many scholars insist that the complexity of
indentures makes it too costly and inadequate in "its ability to foresee, and
therefore guard against, potential bondholders hazards."29'
E. Fiduciary Duty to Bondholders
The imposition of fiduciary duties in respect of bondholders as a solution
to the problem of transferring wealth from stockholders to bondholders has
long been debated.298 A fiduciary duty is usually referred to in the context of
what directors owe to a corporation and to shareholders. A fiduciary duty is
a duty of "the finest loyalty."2' It was famously described by Justice Cardozo
as "not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive."'  A
fiduciary duty is generally thought of as encompassing both a duty of loyalty
and a duty of care. 3' 1 Those duties commonly require that a director will act
without faithlessness or self-dealing while affirmatively protecting the
interests of the corporation through informed decisions.'
The idea that corporate directors owe a fiduciary duty to bondholders
originated in 1939 in the decision of Pepper v. Litton.' 3 The case involved
a corporation that became insolvent, but still was not declared bankrupt.3' 4 In
this frequently cited decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a stockholder
was prohibited from acting in his own benefit and to the detriment of
creditors.30 5 The Court determined that a "fiduciary obligation is designed for
the protection of the entire community of interests in the corporation-
296 McDaniel, supra note 265, at 413.
297 Thomas E. Stagg &ScottFerretti, Contractual Protection: An Existing Remedy ForBondholder
Distress, 4 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 245, 264 (1989).
296 See generally William W. Bratton, Jr., Corporate Debt Relationships: Legal Theory in a Time
of Reconstructing, DUKE LJ. (1989), and William W. Bratton, The Interperation of Contracts Governing
Corporate Debt Relationships, 5 CARDOZO L REv. 371 (1984). It is not the purpose of this discussion to
fully explore the question of imposing fiduciary duties towards bondholders.
M John C. Carter, The Fiduciary Rights of Shareholders, 29 WM. & MARY L REv. 823, 824
(1988).
3Wo See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545,546 (1928).
301 See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Formes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 179 (Del. 1985).
3o See Nancy T. Oliver, Fiduciary Obligations to Holders of Convertible Debentures: Simons v.
Cogan, 549 A.2d 300 (Del. 1988), 58 U. CIN. L REV. 751,754-55 (1989).
3 Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
3W See id. at 307.
3W See id.
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creditors as well as stockholders."'  Subsequent cases seem to adopt the
holding of Pepper. For example, in Green v. Hamilton, the court relied on the
decision in Pepper and included the bondholders in "the entire community of
interests in the corporation."'  However, this statement was in dicta, as the
court held that convertible bondholders had a cause of action based on
fraud.3°' In other cases, courts have created a construction in which the
directors owed a fiduciary duty to bondholders, but this duty was derived from
the indenture.' °9 This suggests that courts imposed a lesser contractual
standard of good faith and not necessarily the higher standard of fiduciary
duty. 30 Additionally, although the Pepper holding seemed to provide for
fiduciary duties owed to bondholders, it must be recognized that the context
of the case was that of bankruptcy," or at least insolvency. In this context,
it is appropriate to be reminded of the "trust fund doctrine." According to this
doctrine upon insolvency directors no longer owe a duty to stockholders;
instead, they owe their duty to the corporation's creditors. As only insolvency
triggers that doctrine, and since Pepper was decided under a factual situation
of insolvency, it only applies to post-insolvency cases. 312
Moreover, many courts have forcefully argued that contract law, rather
than corporate fiduciary law, should be the basis for bondholder protection.
In fact, it was the traditional position of courts that creditors, including
bondholders, should protect themselves with proper provisions in their
contracts. Thus, courts typically declined to extend fiduciary protection to
bondholders.31 3 This was also true regarding convertible bonds, where the
holder is allowed to convert debt into equity.
In Harff v. Kerkorian, the court held that "debenture holders are not
stockholders and their rights are determined by their contract. 31 4  In
Pittsburgh Terminal v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., convertible-bondholders
3 Id.
3W Green v. Hamilton, 437 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
M9 See id.
3W See Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc); Gardner & Florence
Call Cowles Found. v. Empire Inc., 589 F. Supp. 669 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 754 F.2d
478 (2d Cir. 1985).
310 See Stagg & Ferretti, supra note 297, at 261.
311 See id. at 257.
312 In Pepper, the court held that the debt owed by the corporation to one of its directors, an insider
debt, was subordinated to the other debts of the corporation in accordance with the "cardinal principles of
equity jurisprudence." See Pepper, 308 U.S. at 306.
313 See William W. Bratton, Jr., The Economics and Jurisprudence of Convertible Bonds, 1984
Wis. L REV. 667, 668 (1984).
314 Harff v. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215 (Del. Ch. 1974), affrd in part, rev'd in part, 347 A.2d 133
(Del. 1975). Kerkorian was a director and controlling shareholder of Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (MGM).
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attacked a corporation's failure to notify them of a dividend payment to
shareholders.315 Although one of the judges in the panel claimed that fiduciary
duties to bondholders might exist, the other two members of the panel
specifically disclaimed such a notion." 6 Ultimately, the court's opinion was
based on the contract and the implied covenant of good faith.317 In Simons v.
Cogan, a supplemental indenture was issued as a consequence of a merger
between two related companies.1 The supplement determined that the bonds
would no longer be convertible to common stock on a one-to-one basis, but
rather they would be convertible based on the fixed price of the stock under
the merger deal, which was $12.319 Since the principal amount of each bond
was $19.20, this move reflected substantial losses to the bondholders and they
sued for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraud.32' The
Delaware court rejected the claim under breach of fiduciary duty stating that
the bondholders were not owed such duty.32' Instead, the rights of the
bondholders were to be determined by their contract, and by the covenant of
good faith, in limited occasions.322 It was emphasized that the good faith
covenant must not be confused with a fiduciary duty.323 In addition, the court
refused to give any significance to the fact that the bonds were convertible
into stock at the holder's choice. 3  Thus, as long as the right to convert is not
exercised, the holder of the option to convert is the creditor of the company. 25
The court said that the bondholder, prior to conversion, does not face the risks,
which the fiduciary duty was designed to address.326
Another appealing argument for rejecting the notion of fiduciary duty owed
to bondholders is the critical difference between bondholder and stockholder
interests. Determining that management owes fiduciary duties to both
bondholders and stockholders creates a difficulty in situations that certain
decisions would benefit one group while harming the other. One interesting




31 Simons v. Cogan, 542 A.2d 785,787 (Del. Ch. 1987). Cogan controlled Knoll International Inc.
319 See id.
32 See id.
321 See id. at 786, 791.
322 See id. at 787.
323 See id.; see also Katz v. Oak Industries, Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 880 (Del. Ch. 1986) (while
rejecting the existence of fiduciary duties owed to bondholders, the court held that there is a duty of good
faith and fair dealing that arises from the contract and he intentions of the contracting parties).
324 See Simons, 542 A.2d at 788.
325 See id. at 788-89.
32 See id.
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case that emphasizes this potential dilemma is the case of Revlon v.
MacAndrews, which involved an attempt to acquire Revlon by a hostile tender
offer made by Pantry Pride. 27 In response, Revlon bought approximately a
third of its own stock in exchange for subordinated notes. In order to deter
Pantry Pride from acquiring Revlon with junk bond financing,32 the notes
included covenants restricting the ability of diluting the debt. However,
during a negotiation with another potential buyer of its stocks, Revlon waived
those restrictive covenants in exchange for the promise of a higher interest
rate.329  Still, Pantry Pride ultimately topped the other offer, and the
noteholders were left without protection against dilution. 33° The court held
that the directors of Revlon breached their fiduciary duty to the shareholders
by making concessions "out of concern to their liability to the noteholders,
rather than maximizing the sale price of the company for the stockholders
benefit. ' 33' The court in Revlon stated that the noteholders' rights were
determined by contract and the fiduciary duty to stockholders prevailed.332
But what should Revlon have done if the directors owed a fiduciary duty to
both the noteholders and the stockholders? It is clear that putting the
bondholders and stockholders in the same position with regard to the fiduciary
duties owed by the directors is problematic as a practical matter. It seems that
the inevitable conflict between the interests of the two groups does not allow
- at least practically - equal protection by a fiduciary duty.
F. The Case of Leveraged Buyouts and Takeovers
Court refusal to endow bondholders with fiduciary rights was sustained
through the takeover market of the 1980s, which featured conditions hostile
to bondholders. During the eighties it became more and more common for
companies to be involved in mergers, acquisitions, leveraged buyouts, and
recapitalizations for numerous objectives.33 These kinds of transactions,
usually backed by a leveraged recapitalization, increased shareholder wealth
at the expense of bondholders. 3 ' If a company involved in a risky project
borrows money to redeem stock, the surviving shareholders can expect to be
327 Revlon v. MacAndrews, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
3, The term "junk bonds" commonly refers to high-yield and high-risk bonds rated "Ba" and below
by Moody's Investors Services or "BB" and below by Standard & Poor's. See McDaniel, supra note 266,
at 415.
329 See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 178.
330 See id,
331 See id. at 179.
33 See id. at 182.
333 See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 10, at 933 n.2.
33 See id. at 948-49.
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benefited without bearing any risk. On the other hand, the bondholders would
face a company with a higher level of risk and chance of failure, while gaining
nothing if the company succeeds. Of course, theoretically, bondholders could
have demanded higher interest rates that would compensate for this greater
risk, but even if they managed to do that at the negotiating point, they could
never really predict the level of risk that the company chooses to bear in the
future.
From 1984 to 1988, bonds of 183 companies lost value as a result of
mergers, acquisitions, and leveraged buyouts.335 Forty-five of these companies
had their bonds downgraded by Moody's Investors Service from investment
grade to speculative grade.336 Recapitalizations, which often occurred in the
face of a takeover threat, adversely affected the bonds of ninety other
corporations.337
In an environment in which takeovers, mergers and acquisitions are
expected, the disparities of interest between holders of stocks and holders of
debt are accentuated. 338 Although such transactions often earn large gains for
shareholders, it is usually at the expense of bondholders and other unsecured
creditors. One famous example is the case of RJR Nabisco, which announced
in 1988 what was at that time the largest leveraged buyout in history. 339 The
company's bonds dropped overnight by about 20 percent and their Moody's
rating was reduced from 'A' to 'Caa' resulting in bondholder losses of around
$1 billion.'d As a consequence, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company
claimed it lost $40 million on its investment in those bonds, although it was
assessed at the same time that Metropolitan gained over $20 million on its
RJR Nabisco stock holdings.34 Thus, it was widely argued that those
leveraged deals make bonds riskier and prompts stronger protection of
bondholders through indenture provisions.
Companies that wanted to raise capital by issuing bonds were forced to
accommodate bondholder fears. A "change of control covenant" was
developed, according to which the bondholders had the right to either sell the
bonds to the company at a predetermined price, or to have the interest rate
33 See id. at 933 n.2.
33 See id.
117 See id.
33 See Oliver, supra note 302, at 770.
339 See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 10, at 972.
3o See id. at 932.
34 See Christopher Farrell et al., Bondholders are Mad as Hell - and They're Not Going to Take
it Anymore, Bus. WK., Feb. 6, 1989, at 82.
342 See Matthew Winkler, Wall Street Is Devising the Takeover-Proof Bond, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3,
1988, at Cl.
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increased. 43 The triggering incident is usually the acquisition of more than
a certain percentage of company shares or a downgrading in the bond's credit
rating, or both. Those provisions were also labeled as "event risk covenants"
or "poison pills."'  The latter label reflects their role of deterring potential
buyers of the company.
The question is whether change of control provisions gives bondholders
sufficient protection. First, we must hope that these provisions are well
drafted, so that they will be violated in every case where wealth is transferred
from bondholders to shareholders. The definition of the triggering event
should be simple and encompassing. Still, it must be understood that not
every risky situation can be predicted, especially when dealing with a contract
that is expected to endure for decades.
Second, it must be noted that the issuer management will tend to object to
the inclusion of such change of control provisions in the indenture. Whereas,
it has been suggested that management and bondholder interests in such
protective provisions coincide,"4 there are opposite contentions. The basic
argument is that management is equally interested in deterring hostile
acquisitions, and therefore it is motivated to include control change provisions
in the indenture.' However, management's primary concern is the personal
loss of position as a result of a hostile takeover. Thus, management could
support a friendly acquisition.341 Moreover, when management wants to
increase leverage in order to deter hostile takeovers, it certainly has a conflict
of interest with bondholders. A covenant that covers only hostile acquisitions
is not sufficient from the bondholders' point of view.4 In addition,
management would probably prefer to take other actions against hostile bids
in order to allow itself an unlimited process of decision-making.4 9 An
empirical study covering 122 bonds with change of control covenants between
1986 and 1991 illustrated that only 10 percent were "oriented solely toward
bondholder protection."3" In the other 90 percent, a managerial interest was
present.35' Therefore, the different interest of management and bondholders
brings the negotiation issue back to the spotlight. As argued above, as long
as bondholders are poorly represented at the negotiation stage, management
3 See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 10, at 934.
3" See id.
34 See John C. Coffee, Unstable Coalitions: Corporate Governance as a Multi-Player Game, 78
GEO. L. 1495 (1990).
M6 See id at 1519-20.
3 See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 10, at 949.
3 See id.
30 See ia
3W d. at 968.
31 See id. at 969.
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interest will probably prevail. Thus no or at least insufficient protection will
be provided to bondholders.
Third, the phenomenon of control covenants turned out to be temporary.
By the first half of the 1990s, when takeover activity declined, the use of
change of control provisions declined dramatically, although surely still in the
interest of bondholders.3 2 Moreover, customary merger techniques have a
similar effect on a company's debt portfolio. The same could be said of
repurchases of an issuer's outstanding shares, as well as other restructuring
techniques that are sometimes financed by new junk bond debt.353 Indeed, the
end of the leveraged buyout boom does not reflect the receding of bondholder
risk. One example is the Marriott spin-off that occurred in 1992. Marriott
Corporation notes were issued at par in April 1992 and traded at 110
afterwards. Yet those notes became junk bonds immediately following the
announcement of the spin-off, trading at 80 by the end of October 1992. 354
"[Similar] trend[s] will surely continue as long as opportunism exists to
expropriate value from bondholders. 355 In light of this reality, the suggestion
to increase bondholder awareness of the danger and the market pressure on
issuers and underwriters to include protective provisions in indentures seem
insufficient, if not plainly naive.356 Refraining from using change of control
provisions, which has occurred lately, shows not only that bondholders do not
have the power to protect themselves. It also illustrates that the contractual
protection solution is insufficient in the context of bondholder rights.
G. A Pre-Default Activated Trustee as a Solution
A trustee is in a good position to protect the bondholders from unwanted
management decisions. One of the TIA's primary purposes was to establish
an entity that would enable bondholders to overcome the disadvantageous
position of a widely dispersed class--the difficulty of the collective action
problem. If a trustee could act in accordance with the common interest of
bondholders during a pre-default situation, it would definitely improve their
position - both during the negotiation of contractual protections and during
the life of the bond, when monitoring management activities is required. In
352 See id. at 978. While $156 billion was paid for acquisitions of public companies in 1988, it fell
to $122 billion in 1989, $48 billion in 1990 and $32 billion in 1991.
353 See Riger, supra note 218, at 213.
354 See F. John Stark et al., "Marriott Risk": A New Model Covenant to Restrict Transfers of
Wealth from Bondholders to Stockholders, 5 CoLuM. Bus. L REv 503 (1994).
M Id. at 506.
35 See Thomas R. Hurst & Larry J. McGuinness, The Corporation, the Bondholder and Fiduciary
Duties, 10 J.L & CoM. 187,195 (1991).
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other words, the suggested solution is an "activated trustee" that is encouraged
to play a part in the formation of the indenture, and a continuing part in
monitoring the conduct and financial position of the issuer.3"' The ideal
trustee is one that is truly a representative of the bondholders--one that is
acting as if conducting its own affairs, as if the bonds were issued in its name
and as if its own money was at stake.
The activated trustee suggestion is not free of difficulties. First, all the
arguments concerning the bondholders' inabilities to enforce indenture
provisions apply also to the activated trustee, as these arguments were not
based on the number and dispersion of the bondholders. Thus, the trustee will
encounter difficulties in both identifying unwanted actions and forcing
management to avoid them. Another discouraging factor is the definition and
perception of the role of the trustee in an indenture. As mentioned above, the
trustee's role is only seen as administrative. An administrative agent cannot
be expected to initiate interventions in the managerial decision process. The
TIA and indentures do not encourage such behavior by the trustee. In this
respect the interests of the trustee and the issuer coincide. A second factor,
which makes it less likely that the activated trustee will have an interest in
controlling managerial discretion, is the fear of liability. As was historically
true, trustees sometime found themselves more engaged in protecting
themselves than in protecting bondholders. Indeed, it seems that the widest
exposure of a trustee is when both bondholders and the issuer feel injured.
Trustee reliance on issuer declarations and counsel opinions, as allowed by the
TIA,358 encourages a trustee to remain passive, hiding behind the TIA's
provisions.
A startling example of a dangerously passive trustee was the dramatic
default of the Washington Public Power Supply System Nuclear Projects 4
and 5. The projects, held by 88 participating cities, were terminated in 1983
before completion, causing the bondholders losses of $7.2 billion. 59 The
court found that the participating cities lacked the statutory authority to issue
the bonds, and therefore, under the ultra vires doctrine, these bonds were
void.3" This fiasco not only raised the financial costs of municipal borrowers,
but also raised questions regarding the role of trustees prior to default.361
357 See Friedman, supra note 67, at 356.
358 See Trust Indenture Act of 1939 § 314(4), 15 U.S.C § 77nnn(4) (1997).
359 See Dan Fischer, WPPSS and Hammersmith: Increased Credit Risk Protection Resulting From
Unprecedented Defaults, 9 ARIZ. J. INT'L & CoMP. L 513 (1992).
360 See Chemical Bank v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 666 P.2d 329 (Wash. 1983), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1065 (1985).
361 See Theodore J. Sawicki, The Washington Public Power Supply System Bond Default:
Expanding the Preventive Role of the Indenture Trustee, 34 EMORY LJ. 157, 159 (1985).
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However, things could be at least a little different if the trustee was viewed
as an active protector of bondholders. In fact, if a trustee is forced to act as a
prudent person "in the conduct of his own affairs" in pre-default situations,3 62
then the legal status of the bonds will be more thoroughly examined prior to
issuance. It is indisputable that the more a trustee can act as a single creditor
of the issuer, the more it will be able to detect major flaws in the issue and
monitor certain actions of issuer management. Just like any other large
creditor, it could monitor the issuer's conduct and the issuer's ability to pay
debt at any given time. It could also monitor the managerial decision-making
process.
To accommodate such a change, the TIA would have to be amended to
provide the trustee with the necessary tools. Those amendments would have
to put the trustee in a position where it can have access to the issuers'
decision-making processes. It should have the ability to use independent
experts, like accountants and lawyers, to investigate suspected decisions made
by management. It should also have reasonable access to information
concerning such decisions. In other words, full cooperation between the
trustee and the issuer would have to be achieved, as is often the case when the
creditor is a large bank, an institutional investor, or other private-debt lender.
Of course, a balance must be found so that the independence of the issuer will
not be interfered with in a way that would be a detriment both to the company
and to the bondholders. Creative ways must be designed in order to assure the
trustee's ability to monitor the issuer's management without a brutal
intervention in the business considerations of the company. In order to avoid
such a trap, the trustee's new powers should resemble those of an accountant
or financial consultant who is in a position to advise the company, or a
potential buyer of the company, as to its financial position. This means it will
not have the authority to intervene in decisions, as it should not have any
voting rights in board of directors meetings. Yet the most important effect
would be reporting suspect conduct to the bondholders. In turn, the
bondholders should be the ones to determine whether their rights have been
violated. In other words, the trustee should look for suspect actions and
situations, investigate such actions and situations with the aid of independent
counselors, and disclose the results of the investigation to the bondholders.
To avoid making such reports to the bondholders a warning sign to the market,
a frequent pre-scheduled reporting system should be developed. If this
process is well backed by legislation, it should eventually lessen bondholder
risk. Surely these activities would make the trustee more attuned to indications
362 As the standard of care required from the trustee after default. See 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(c).
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of possible failure, and thus allow bondholders to protect their interests before
it is too late.
The most essential change would be to motivate the trustee to participate
effectively in the negotiation of the indenture. If the trustee is judged at this
early stage as a prudent person "in the conduct of his own affairs,"363 it might
be motivated to actively participate in the negotiation and truly represent the
prospective bondholders.
Although this suggestion requires a mini-revolution in the pre-default role
of trustees, it would be consistent with the general role of trustees as
protectors of bondholders against conflicting interests of issuer management
and shareholders. That is why putting the trustee in an activated position is
preferable over the suggested third party representative, although such a third
party could implement the task just as well.3 The activated trustee would
also be consistent with the courts' refusals to recognize a fiduciary duty owed
to bondholders. As argued above, such a duty is not desirable and
bondholders should rely on their indenture as a source of their rights. The
suggestion to re-define the trustee's pre-default role would allow the
continuation of using a contractual protection model - this time with real
content.
Once again, it must be emphasized that the suggestion presented here is not
free of flaws. First, the trustee will need more professional advice, since
specialized advice will be required in order to accomplish the task. The
activated trustee also faces a higher risk of being sued. Therefore, it will
necessarily lead the trustee to charge more for its services. The question is
whether that additional sum will outweigh the present value of possible losses
bondholders expect to bear due to managerial opportunism. 36 In other words,
this could be a price that bondholders - and society - need to pay in order
to achieve the goals set by the TIA.
As for the increased risk of suits against the trustee, originating from both
bondholders and issuers, there are at least two mitigating observations. First,
the additional payment to the trustee should cover the additional risk. But,
more to the point, the prudent person standard is not a very high standard of
care. After all, the trustee is not responsible for the misconduct of the issuer,
and it is only required to act as a prudent person. The standard of care should
be reasonable foreseeability. A reminder should be made too, that this
standard of care is less stringent than that of the Barkley Bill, which preceded
the TIA.3 s The proposed provision in the Bill required that the trustee act as
M3 l
M4 See Corey. supra note 269, at 981.
M See Robertson, supra note 223, at 485-86.
M6 See discussion supra Part IU(A).
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a prudent person who is a fiduciary possessing the degree of skill of a
trustee.367 According to that proposal, if the trustee introduces itself as having
a higher degree of skill than it actually has, then the higher level will set the
standard under which the prudent person should be examined. 3 A lesser
standard was eventually adopted by the TIA. 69 An emphasis should also be
given to the second part of the standard, the duty of the trustee to act as if it
conducts its own affairs. As this should be the test, it is possible that the
trustee will be able to rely on reports of independent agents. Yet it would be
less sensible to completely trust issuer reports. In any case, after the courts
define the scope of liability of the redefined role of the trustee, it would clarify
what is to be expected from such trustees.
One must also acknowledge that the redefinition of the trustee's role will
not solve all the problems discussed above, such as the ability of creditors to
predict certain transactions in the modem market environment. If a trustee
that exercises the standard of care required could not predict an unknown
mechanism that has the effect of diluting bondholder debt, then it cannot be
held liable for it. Still, in such a scenario, bondholders will face losses due to
the flow of wealth from them to the shareholders. However, the redefinition
of the trustee role should have a positive effect on the indenture as a bargain
between the issuer and the bondholders, and therefore the bondholders would
be better protected at least against known hazards.
Although there are some drawbacks in the pre-default imposition of the
prudent person standard upon trustees, it is still a suggestion that would
improve the position of bondholders dramatically, and enable them to act and
react almost as a single creditor. By lending money, creditors, including
bondholders, assume risk and that action cannot be risk-free. Therefore, a
reasonable level of risk will be well tolerated by bondholders. It is only the
excess exposure to management discretion that this suggestion attempts to
address.
The conclusion should be clear: as long as the trustee's pre-default role is
administrative and passive, the trustee is less likely to be in a position to
control managerial discretion in order to protect bondholders from managerial
opportunism. Yet, if the basic perception is changed, and trustees assume a
more active role, it is possible not only to monitor management conduct, but
also to detect warnings about a prospective default. This, of course, will
dramatically improve the bondholders' position and increase the likelihood
that they will see their investment back.
3 See Johnson, supra note 41, at 111.
3" See id.
M9 See Trust Indenture Act of 1939 § 315(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(c) (1997).
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VI. CONFLICr OF INTEREST CONCERNS
The question of conflict of interest between trustees and bondholders is
perhaps the most debated issue in this field. As mentioned before, one of the
main purposes of the TIA was to eliminate any possible conflict of interest,
so that a disinterested trustee will perform its duty to bondholders in the best
possible way. The SEC's report that preceded the TIA enactment expressed
dismay at the common practice of creating some sort of alliance between
trustees and obligors.370 It was argued that, when conflicting interests were
involved, "the trustee will be either unwilling or unable to look at the situation
objectively.""' An example of the problem, originally described in the report,
was the case of R.H. Hoe & Company. 31 Guaranty Trust Company was the
trustee of bonds issued by Hoe . 73 The relationship between Guaranty and
Hoe was so entangled as to be inconceivable from a modem perspective.
Guaranty was not only a creditor of Hoe, having lent $1,700,000, it was also
in control of Hoe through common stocks and voting trust rights.374 In
addition, an affiliate of Guaranty was an underwriter of Hoe's securities.3 75
This situation led to an intense conflict of interest even before default
occurred.376 Once it appeared that Hoe was in financial difficulty, Guaranty
moved to decrease its loan and increase its collateral through a modification
to the loan agreement. 3' A modification would not have been possible if
Guaranty did not have control over Hoe's board of directors, which in turn
meant fewer assets were available for the bondholders.3 7' Needless to say,
Guaranty did not inform the bondholders of the impending default.379
The TIA dealt with the problem of conflicts of interest through Section
31 0(b).3" This section sets limitations on the trustee's qualifications, deriving
from situations of conflicting interests."' In originally nine and currently ten
370 See Friedman. supra note 67, at 330.
371 Johnson, supra note 41, at 102.






37 See Friedman, supra note 67, at 333.
379 See SEC Report, supra note 53.
no See Trust Indenture Act of 1939 § 310(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77ilj(b) (1997)
33 See id.
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subsections, "the Act specifies in meticulous detail the conditions under which
a trustee is deemed to have a conflict of interest.
' 382
Section 3 10(b)(1) determines that a potential conflict of interest exists if
the trustee is also acting as a trustee under other indentures of the same
obligor.38 3 The rationale is to prevent a situation in which, upon default, the
trustee represents the two bondholder groups, with adverse interests. There
are two main exceptions set by the Act where no such conflict of interest is
likely to exist and in such situations one trustee could act under two
indentures of the same obligor. First, it is not considered a conflict when one
indenture is the collateral of the other.3" In this situation the two indentures
are assumed to have the same interest, since the value of one indenture is
dependent on the other. The second exception is made for unsecured and
equally ranked issues, with no differences that would make them likely to
conflict.3 5 Here too, no conflict is likely to arise, but the SEC may still
prohibit such situations if is finds otherwise.38 6
A potential conflict of interest is also recognized when the trustee, or any
of its directors or executive officers, is also an obligor or underwriter.387 The
prohibition here is clear, as being a debtor and a trustee for the creditor is
problematic, and the underwriter might have close ties to the issuer's
management. 38 For the same reason, the trustee cannot directly or indirectly
control or be controlled by the obligor or the underwriter.3 9
Section 3 10(b)(4) to the TIA determines that if the trustee or more than one
of its directors or executive officers is a director, officer, employee or
representative of the obligor or the underwriter, a conflict of interest exists.
That means that only one director or executive officer of the trustee can be a
director or executive officer of the obligor. Yet, that representative of the
trustee cannot be an executive officer of both the obligor and the trustee. It can
be an executive officer in one and a director in the other. In addition, in case
the trustee has more than nine directors, it can appoint an additional director
as an obligor's director, so two representatives of the trustee sit in a high
position at the obligor' s top management. 39' This provision allows the trustee
to have one or two representatives on the board of directors of the obligor,
M Friedman, supra note 67, at 333.
M3 See 15 U.S.C. § 77jij(b)(1).
3M See id. § 77iii(b)(1)(A).
3 See Ui § 77iii(b)(1)(C).
3See Ud. § 77ji(b)(1)(i).
3 See id. § 77ill(b)(2).
M See Friedman, supra note 67, at 334.
M9 See 15 U.S.C. § 77ilj(b)(3).
390 See idt § 77jji(b)(4).
391 See id. § 77iii(b)(4)(B).
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which might be problematic. The drafters of this provision were concerned
that the obligor might attempt to interfere with the trustee's decisions
concerning the bondholders, but were nevertheless willing to allow some
possible influence.
Subsection 5 to Subsection 9 of Section 310(b) involve the ownership of
voting securities in the trustee, the obligor and an affiliate or parent company
of the obligor.3" The Act determined specific percentages, above which a
conflict of interest is assumed.393
Section 310(b)(10) prohibits the trustee from being or becoming a creditor
of the obligor.39 Although the problematic position of a creditor-trustee was
discussed prior to the TIA's legislation, it was not originally regarded a
conflicting interest under Section 310(b). The only original reference to a
creditor-trustee was in Section 311. The provision did not prohibit such
relationship outright, but rather stated that the trustee may not retain for its
own benefit any payments it received in its capacity as a creditor of the
obligor within four months before a default in payment occurred. Such funds
must be set aside and shared with the bondholders. Many scholars attacked
the failure to define the case of a creditor-trustee as one of the situations
where conflict of interest occurs.3 95 In York v. Guaranty Trust Co., a creditor-
trustee participated in the reorganization plan of an obligor instead of forcing
the obligor to liquidate, which led to a very small amount of assets left for
those bondholders who did not join the reorganization. 39 The court held that
the trustee failed to force liquidation upon the obligor because it was
interested in protecting its own position as a creditor.3 ' Although the TIA did
not prohibit the trustee from being a creditor of the obligor, the court decided
that the trustee's inaction under the belief that it would be benefited by it was
a breach of the trustee's obligations.3 A few other cases, already mentioned,
illustrate the courts' attitudes towards the creditor-trustee, despite the lack of
explicit direction from Congress.
The prohibition against a creditor-trustee conflict was one of the main
innovations of the TIRA. The nature of the trusteeship under the TIA was
such that many trustees were banks or affiliates of banks.399 This reality led
on the one hand to a greater probability that a trustee would be or become a
392 Id. §§ 77jji(b)(5)-77iii(b)(9).
393 See id.
3% Id. § 77iii(b)(10).
395 See, e.g., Obrzut, supra note 41, at 132; Campbell & Zack, supra note 103, at 1705.
39 York v. Guaranty Trust Co., 143 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944), rev'd on other grounds, 326 U.S. 99
(1945).
397 See id.
393 See id. at 513-14.
39 See Kelley, supra note 227, at 199.
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creditor of the issuer, especially in light of customary syndicated loans.' On
the other hand, the powerful banks were aggressively attempting to influence
Congress to avoid "tying their hands."' The outcome reflected a
compromise between these two forces. Indeed, the TIRA included the
creditor-trustee in the list of prohibited conflicting interest.' But the
emphasis must be made that the prohibition is only exercised when there is
default.4°3
The most important part of Section 3 10(b) turned out to be the timing of
activating the conflict of interests limitations rather than the definitions of the
conflicting interest situations. The original TIA determined that once a trustee
fell under one of the then nine possible situations of Section 310(b), the
trustee was disqualified.' In such a case, the trustee either had to eliminate
the conflicting interest or resign within ninety days after discovering the
conflict. 5 If the trustee failed to take either of those steps, it had to notify the
bondholders, who then had the power to obtain a court order to remove the
trustee from office.' Of course, this prerogative did not relieve the trustee
from its duty to remove any conflict.
The TIRA changed this situation dramatically, reinforcing the notion that
the trustee's pre-default role is merely ministerial.' Thus, the TIRA provided
that the trustee might continue to serve as such, notwithstanding the existence
of a conflict of interest, so long as there has been no default.' The rationale
behind this construction was that prior to default the harm is only potential
and not actual. The current requirement sets a post-default conflict of interest
standard. Upon default, the trustee has 90 days to eliminate the conflicting
interest.' If the default is not cured during this time, the trustee must
resign.
410
In accordance with the discussion of the trustee's pre-default role, the
distinction the TIA made between pre-default and post-default conflict of
interest is not to the benefit of bondholders. As argued above, in the pre-
default situation, entities with conflicting interests might attempt to transfer
4 See idat 201.
401 Id. at 199.
4 See Trust Indenture Act of 1939 § 310(b)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 77jj(b)(10) (1997).
40 See id. § 77jjj(b)(i).
4W See id. § 77ijj(b).
40 See id.
4W See id.
4 See Kelley, supra note 227, at 204.
4 There is an exception that the obligor and its affiliates cannot serve as trustees for its own
securities. See 15 U.S.C. §77iii(a)(5).
4 See id. § 77jjj(b).
410 See id.
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wealth from the bondholders.4 Although the discussion was focused on the
issuer's shareholders, it is also applicable to managerial decisions to transfer
wealth from other interested parties such as other creditors. If the trustee is a
creditor of the obligor, the obligor is capable of making decisions that will
transfer wealth from the bondholders to the trustee - and that can take place
prior to default.
The postponement of the elimination of conflicting interest until default
occurs has two disturbing aspects. First, the conflicting interest might further
worsen the bondholders' position during the negotiations of the indenture. If
at that time the trustee is a creditor of the issuer or serves as a trustee for
another indenture of the same obligor, or in another conflict of interest with
the prospective bondholders, it is not too difficult to see that the position of
the bondholders is inferior. The trustee would then be even less willing to
aggressively represent the bondholders. This situation puts both the trustee
and the bondholders in an impossible position, where conflicting interests are
supposed to be ignored and a community of interests is assumed to subsist.
One striking example is the clear interest of a creditor-trustee to subordinate
the obligations held by bondholders. Such subordination assures that the
trustee is treated as a senior creditor able to receive "double dividends" from
an insolvent obligor's estate.41  It is clear that the willingness of a creditor-
trustee to include a subordinated debt provision in the indenture is in contrast
to the bondholders' interests. It is obvious why the creditor-trustee will not
even attempt to negotiate a better position for the obligations to the
bondholders.
Second, the effect on the pre-default situation may also be seen as contrary
to the bondholders' interests. As explained, the conflict of interest can be
maintained while no default occurred. The subordinated debt example can be
used in this context as well, only in the converse situation. Where the bonds
are superior to obligations held by the creditor-trustee, the conflict is still
serious. If the obligor will face financial difficulties, the creditor-trustee self
interest will be to act immediately, where as the bondholders' priority will call
for more patient conduct, hoping that the obligor's position will improve.4"3
This creates a situation in which the junior creditor - the creditor-trustee -
might harass the senior creditor - the bondholders - into paying out the
junior creditor and thereby "to turn the subordination upside down."4 4 It is
41 See discussion supra Part V(D).
412 See Campbell & Zack, supra note 103, at 1718. The "double dividend" refers to the senior
creditors' right to both their own allocated sham and the share allocated to junior debt, until the senior debt
is paid. See id. at 1719.
43 See id. at 1720.
414 PLI.IP R. WooD, TE LAw OF SuBORDINATED DEBT 56 (1990).
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therefore clear, that even before default a distressing conflict of interest may
occur.
Marking the default as an activating point was based on the assumption
that a trustee's role pre-default is ministerial and that bondholders' rights are
not offended.4" Both points are disputable. It has already been argued
extensively why a trustee's pre-default role is not and should not be merely
administrative for the sake of bondholders. In addition, the potential danger
of a conflict of interest is risky by definition - assuming that one who
operates in an environment of conflicting risks has his judgment distorted by
selfish criteria - even unwillingly. As Philip Wood had put it, "(tihe
foundation is not actual injury to beneficiaries but the hallowed orison 'lead
us not into temptation.""'4 6 It is not clear why legislators as well as courts
endorsed the perception that only actual conflict of interest should be
alarming. It is also well recognized in case law that pre-default allegations
"have been addressed in a number of cases."'" As described in the SEC's
report from 1936, in the case of Hoe, Guaranty - the trustee - was acting
on its behalf as Hoe's creditor before default occurred. 418 There is no reason
to ignore the possible claims of bondholders deriving from pre-default conduct
of the trustee.
Indeed, the case law established under common law was not overruled by
the TIRA. Therefore, the holdings of Elliott Associates and Hutton, as
discussed earlier, are still applicable. However, in order to find the conflicting
interest forbidden, those cases require an active step made by the trustee for
its own benefit and to the detriment of bondholders. Although those cases
better addressed the bondholders' interests than the TIA does, this position is
not sufficient. First, aware of courts' views, trustees can disguise their
actions. More importantly, the requirement of action encourages the trustee
to be passive even when the bondholders' interests mandate action.
"[Trustees] seldom can, or do, take positive steps to protect investors. When
a [t]rustee's other interests and duties arising from other capacities indicate
that it would be best not to act, subsequent inaction raises the reference that
the inaction was caused by such other interests and duties."4 9 In other words,
the inaction of the trustee might be driven by a conflict of interest. According
to the case law it is not clear that such trustee's behavior will be condemned.
415 See Friedman, supra note 67, at 345.
416 See WoOD, supra note 414, at 98.
417 Friedman, supra note 67, at 204.
41s See SEC Report, supra note 53, at 39-42, 83-88.
419 Campbell & Zack, supra note 103, at 1717.
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Moreover, waiting for default in order to replace a self-interested trustee
is detrimental to bondholders in the sense that it would be a bad time to
replace a trustee. The bondholders will lose an informed trustee and
experience has shown there are difficulties to find a replacement trustee at this
point.42 Therefore, scenarios such as these will probably have "an adverse
effect on the efficiency of bondholders' representation."42'
VII. THE POST-DEFAULT ROLE OF THE TRUSTEE
Many believe that the post-default role of the trustee "provides the greatest
test of the corporate trust officer's skill and expertise. 422 There is no doubt
that one of the main purposes of this trusteeship was to provide a
representative to the bondholders in the case of default, as their disparity
might constitute an obstacle for exercising their rights in such situations.
4 23
The default is considered to be the primary concern of bondholders, as their
investment is at stake, especially in the common case of an unsecured debt.
As many aspects of default have already been addressed above,4 24 this section
concentrates on the definition of default in indentures and on the
responsibilities of trustees after default with a special note regarding the
trustee's role in the case of bankruptcy proceedings.
A. Defining Default
The term "default" used throughout indentures is significant and, therefore,
must be carefully defined in order to avoid confusion and uncertainty.
Indentures contain a detailed clause regarding the events of default.425 By
now, it must be clear that the definition of default in not a merely technical
factor, but rather constitutes a determination of the trustee's role, and mostly
of the bondholders' rights.
Generally speaking, the events of default are designed to reflect a high
probability that future payments of principal and interest will be jeopardized.
If such high probability is detected, the bondholders must promptly act in an
attempt to assure payment and sue the obligor if necessary.
42 See WooD, supra note 414, at 100.
421 Kelley, supra note 227, at 213.
422 LANDAU, supra note 63, at 173.
43 See Johnson, supra note 41. at 92.
424 See discussion supra Part VI.
42 See Friedman, supra note 67, at 347.
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Defaults in the payment of principal or interest are always considered
serious and give rise to the remedial provisions.426 Some indentures provide
for a 30-day grace period in the case of a failure to pay interest on the due
date, as the ABF model suggests.427 But even Robert Landau asserts that no
grace period should be provided because of the "serious nature of this type of
default" and because it is very unlikely to happen due to mere carelessness. 4 2'
One should also be reminded that the trustee's right to withhold notices of
default under certain circumstances does not apply to this case, and the trustee
must act immediately.429
It is also quite common to include in the default definition a failure to pay
principal or interest on any or some of the other indebtedness of the issuer.430
This failure might indicate a financial stress and therefore it is desirable, but
still most indentures give in this case generous grace periods to allow the cure
of the default.43' Some even require the "ripening of the default" and an
acceleration by the holders of the other indebtedness.432 In the same way,
other obligations of the issuer, prior in lien to the lien of the bonds, are to be
adequately managed. A breach in those obligations is considered a default,
since the interest of the subordinated debt holders is concerned.433 For
example, if the payment of the prior-lien bonds is not delivered and the senior
creditors react inefficiently, junior bondholders are adversely affected. The
chance of being able to redeem the investment through the lien decreases
when the prior lien debt is not settled, since the priority will be used to pay the
other bondholders. The bondholders will prefer to rely on the lien rather than
on the emptying funds of the issuer and therefore need to be able to interfere
when a prior-lien debt defaults.
In addition, the breach of the indenture by the obligor is bound to lead to
default. Of course, there are many covenants in the indenture that are not
critical and at least in some situations may be considered minor breaches. The
ABF Commentaries on Model Indentures acknowledges this issue by
suggesting that when the obligor fails to supply a particular financial report,
"it is not necessarily an indication that the payment of the [bonds] is in
'26 See LANDAU, supra note 63, at 173.
427 See id.
42 See id. at 75. Similarly, the failure to make other payments due to the bondholders, such as a
sinking fund payment, are also considered under the default definition, only a grace period is usually
provided for these. See id. at 174.
429 See Trust Indenture Act of 1939 § 315(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(b) (1997).
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jeopardy."'  Although this failure might indicate that the issuer is in some
sort of distress, and may even be concealing what it considers to be negative
data, it would not be sensible to define all breaches as default. Therefore, it
is customarily provided that the trustee or a specified percentage of the
bondholders shall give formal written notice to the issuer-plus a grace
period-before a default occurs in such cases.43 It might be suggested that
certain limited numbers of covenants, besides the payment of principal and
interest, should be defined as serious breaches that do not require such a long
wait before any action can be made. For example, the negative pledge
covenant, prohibiting the creation of prior liens, might be included in such a
category. That would certainly encourage issuers to put those covenants on
a high priority, and it will enable the bondholders to act immediately when
they feel their investment is in serious jeopardy. The inclusion of certain
provisions in such a category depends on the power of the bondholders during
the negotiation process.
Two more instances are considered an event of default. These are the
voluntary and involuntary adjudication of the issuer as bankrupt. This
includes consent to enter an order for relief against it, consent to appoint a
custodian for its property or, under state law, making a general assignment for
the benefit of its creditors. A default is also triggered by a court order under
any bankruptcy law or an order of liquidation. The condition is that any of the
instances remain without a stay and in effect for sixty days. This gives the
issuer a fair opportunity to act for the dismissal of the bankruptcy proceedings.
Another recommended event that should be defined as default, although
not so commonly done, is the failure of the issuer to satisfy a substantial final
judgment. The fact that the issuer is not able to pay as the judgment
determined might indicate trouble. Notice that the unsatisfied judgment may
result in a lien on the issuer's assets,436 which might be prohibited by the
indenture and therefore lead to default under one of the other events.437
According to Section 315(b) of the TIA, the trustee shall give the
bondholders notice of all defaults "known to the trustee," within ninety days
after it occurred.43 The language of the provision suggests that the trustee has
no duty to identify events of default. Thus, a passive trustee in the pre-default
situation is under no obligation to search for signs and indications of a default.
4M Id.
4M See UL
as See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.LR. LAW § 5203 (McKinney 1997) (a judgment creates lien on local real
estate).
437 See COMMENTARIES ON INDENTURES, supra note 171, at 213.
4M See Trust Indenture Act of § 1939(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(b) (1997).
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Yet the trustee does not have immunity against negligent conduct,439 so it must
be sure to have access to information that a reasonable person would have.
The trustee is also given the discretion to refrain from notifying the
bondholders of a default, where withholding such a notice is in the interest of
the bondholders.' ° If there is a possibility of curing the default, then "too
hasty action in publicizing the default can cause irreparable damage.""'
Section 315(b) requires that the decision of withholding a notice will be taken
by the trustee's top management and in good faith." 2
A remark should be made regarding the grace period given to the issuer
after a breach of the indenture. Although the grace period usually serves both
the issuer's interest and the bondholders' interests, this is not always the case.
In some situations, the bondholders' investment will have better chances to
survive a default if a grace period is provided. The hope is that during the
grace period the default will somehow be cured. In contrast, there might be
certain situations, in which the grace period will have the effect of worsening
the bondholders' position. In such cases, the trustee should have the right to
"move promptly."" 3 For now, such flexibility will only be provided in the
indenture if the trustee so insists.
A final note in this regard would be that differing opinions as to the
interpretation of the definition of an event of default might arise. The
contrasting interests of the trustee as a representative of the bondholders from
one hand and of the issuer on the other hand are likely to lead to
disagreements in this respect. Surely the issuer will contend that a certain
situation is not included in the definition of default, while there are grounds
to think otherwise. This might raise issues of conflict of interest between the
trustee and the bondholders, although there is no assurance that the triggering
default event has occurred. Of course, the trustee must ignore any personal
interest it has in the obligor. The trustee should therefore continuously
examine its position regarding those definitions and impartially enforce this
position. The trustee should be ready to pursue a declaratory judgment action
against the issuer in that respect.
439 See id § 77ooo(a).
W4 See id § 77ooo(b).
"I LANDAU, supra note 63, at 184.
"2 See 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(b).
43 LANDAU, supra note 63, at 175.
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B. The Trustee's Responsibility
Prior to the TIA's enactment, the trusteeship was conceived as a
mechanism that allowed the bondholders to act with a unitary voice.4' This
conception led to two provisions commonly included in indentures. The first
was a very broad exculpatory clause relieving the trustee from liability unless
guilty of gross negligence or willful misconduct."' The second provision
stated that only a majority of bondholders would be able to initiate the
activation of the trustee."6 In other words, it was customary that a specific
percentage of bondholders should send the trustee an official demand to
enforce their rights according to the indenture.
The TIA established a new standard the trustee must follow after default."7
The trustee had to exercise powers as indicated in the indenture and use the
same degree of care and skill as a prudent person would exercise under similar
circumstances in the conduct of its own affairs." After the TIRA this
standard became legislatively mandated." 9
Robert Landau asserts that, despite the prudent person standard set by the
TIA, the trustee still has limited powers. 4 - The argument is that while a
prudent person managing his own affairs "can take any action that seems to
be indicated by the circumstances," the trustee can only exercise powers that
were vested in it by the indenture. 45 This attitude seems questionable in light
of Landau's assertion that, in cases where the trustee concludes that the
problematic aspect is seemingly temporary, or could be resolved with the
obligor, it has the authority to act without reference to the bondholders.5 2
This implies that the trustee has the right to act for the benefit of the
bondholders as it sees fit, even without notifying the bondholders. In addition,
the argument of the limited powers of the trustee is not consistent with the fact
that Section 315(a) of the TIA specifically refers to a pre-default situation.453
It determines that prior to default the trustee shall not be liable, "except for
the performance of such duties as are specifically set out in such indenture.' '4M
44 See Posner, supra note 2. at 199.
"S See Johnson, supra note 41, at 95-6.
"6 See Draper, supra note 11, at 95-6.
"7 See 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(c).
"8 See aL
49 See id.
450 See LANDAU. supra note 63. at 179.
45 Id.
452 See id. at 181.
453 See 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(a).
4 Id. § 77ooo(aXI).
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No similar provision governs the post-default situation. Thus, the conclusion
should be that the trustee would be expected to act as a reasonably prudent
person in protecting the bondholders' rights. Although no extraordinary
actions will be anticipated, the trustee will definitely have to show flexibility
and creativity in pursuing those rights. As it is impossible to prescribe a
course of reaction or for that matter predict the possible triggering situations,
it does not make much sense to say that the trustee is only able to use powers
granted to it by the indenture. The least that could be expected of the trustee,
when in doubt, is to either notify the bondholders of troubling facts or ask a
court for instructions (both steps, of course, could be taken concurrently). In
any event, the trustee must be aware that the courts are less likely to favor
behavior of ignoring, overlooking, or elsewhere refraining from action under
circumstances that require otherwise. The trustee should also recognize that
the purpose of the TIA is to protect bondholders' interests and that must be the
ultimate consideration in any decision taken by the trustee - whether to act or
to refrain from action.
Besides the bankruptcy and reorganization route, which will be discussed
below,455 the trustee and the bondholders can deal with a default in diverse
ways. The most obvious routes are negotiation, acceleration, and exercise of
contractual remedies, and lawsuits in search for an injunction or specific
performance order.456 Other possibilities are a foreclosure action or a security
fraud suit.457 There are two main disadvantages related to the pursuit of those
remedies. First, the trustee lacks the powers to act alone in these routes, as it
needs the consent of the bondholders. For example, as mentioned above, the
need for compromise in negotiation prevents the trustee from reaching
significant achievements in this route.45S Also, moving for the acceleration of
the bonds usually requires the endorsement of a special percentage of the
bondholders.459 The second disadvantage in pursuing those remedies is that
they will most likely trigger defaults of other debts of the obligor and
eventually induce bankruptcy.
45 See discussion infra Part VII(c).
4% See Steven R. Gross et al., Restructuring Public Debt Outside Of Chapter 11,556 PU/Comm.
23.43 (1990).
4n See id. at 49.
Ms See id at 44 (suggesting that more investnent houses specialize in troubled situations, allowing
such bonds to be in the hands of a few sophisticated investors, allowing for a direct negotiation between
bondholders and the obligor).
4" See id. at 46.
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C. Bankruptcy and Reorganization
When default occurs the trustee has the authority, under Section 317(a)(1)
of the TIA, to file a petition for reorganization of the issuer.4W In this context,
Robert Landau suggests that the trustee will regard such a petition as "an act
of desperation" and "the last step to be taken."46' Landau argues that such
proceedings often result in losses to the bondholders. Other commentators
have noted that in filing a bankruptcy petition, the trustee "deprives
bondholders of an opportunity to participate with other creditors in an out-of-
court debt restructuring." 2 Although the trustee is not expressly compelled
to act in this situation, the ultimate objective of the trustee's actions must be
the protection of bondholders. And if that objective dictates the filing of a
petition, then this is what the trustee should do. The attempt to describe a
trustee's petition as a last resort is inconsistent with its new standard of care.
A prudent person would seek for alternative solutions, but only up to a certain
point. If that point would be too far, the creditor knows the postponement
only worsens his situation. Therefore, the trustee should weigh the probability
that a quick solution will be found against the fear that a further postponement
will decrease the chance of recovery. This should dictate whether the trustee
should file for reorganization.
In most cases, at least where the bonds are unsecured, 3 liquidation in the
sense of sale of the business or foreclosure will not result in substantial returns
for bondholders."6 Realizing that, bondholders usually support a process of
reorganization. In voting on a reorganization plan, the indenture trustee is not
entitled to make decisions as a representative of the bondholders, since such
a plan involves compromises and adjustments in the indenture and in the
bonds' financial terms." 5 The direct consent of the bondholders themselves
is necessary."6 Even if there is an attempt to accomplish reorganization or
any solution that involves a compromise on the side of the bondholders out-of-
court, the trustee does not have the authority to allow for such adjustments." 7
4W See Trust Indenture Act of 1939 § 317(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77qqq(a)(1) (1997).
46 LANDAU, supra note 63, at 224.
462 Gross, supra note 456, at 33.
40 Although secured or senior bondholder might prefer liquidation, it is unlikely to happen due to
the protection of the Bankruptcy Code that the issuer will immediately seek.
4M See e.g., Wolcott B. Dunham & Peter L Borowitz, The Role of the Indenture Trustee in
Reorganization Cases under the Bankruptcy Code, 102 BANKR. LJ. 439,444 (1985).
W" See LANDAU, supra note 63, at 191.
4M See id, (unless by judicial decree).
46 See Trust Indenture Act of 1939 § 316(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp(b) (1997).
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Again, the bondholders themselves must convene and give their consent to the
suggested plan.' 6
In some cases, the issuer's inability to pay debt results in the issuer seeking
for protection under the Bankruptcy Code. Even if solvent, the issuer can file
a bankruptcy petition under that Code.' 6 Under section 303(b)(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code, a trustee may commence an involuntary bankruptcy case
against the issuer by joining at least two other creditors.4 '0 In all indentures,
a bankruptcy petition filing, voluntary or involuntary, is defined as an event
of default.47 In such a case, the trustee's standard of conduct is raised to that
of a prudent person.472 Concurrently, the trustee is enjoined from pursuing the
remedies mentioned in the indenture.473 Due to the operation of the automatic
stay, from that moment the trustee is subject to the orders of the court.
The right of the trustee to have its voice heard in the reorganization
proceedings has been specifically recognized in Chapters 9 and 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code. The trustee is not required to sit in the creditors'
committee, although many do serve on such committees, seemingly under the
belief that such a move is necessary under the prudent person standard.4"4 The
trustee may also intervene in the proceedings and is entitled to receive notices
of any developments. 4" According to section 1109(b) of the Bankruptcy
Code, the trustee is a "party in interest" and therefore the trustee may raise
issues and be heard by the court.476 Alongside its recognition of the trustee as
the representative of the bondholders, the Bankruptcy Code emphasizes the
bondholders' rights to represent themselves.477 However, it should be noted
that the collective representation by the trustee might have advantages even
at this stage. Beside the impracticability of every bondholder showing up
personally in the proceedings, the trustee voice - as a representative of a
large mass of interests - might be more persuasive.
The trustee should attend most hearings to the extent that those are
reasonably expected to affect the bondholders' position. This duty follows
4U See id.
46 See Thomas E. Plank, The Constitutional Limits of Bankruptcy, 63 TENN. L REv. 487, 556
(1996) (challenging the constitutionality of giving solvent creditors relief under the Bankruptcy Code).
470 See 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1) (1993).
471 See COMMENTARIES ON INDENTURES, supra note 171, at 209.
472 See 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(c).
473 See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (automatic stay provision).
474 See LANDAU, supra note 63, at 223.
475 See 11 U.S.C. § 2202(0.
476 See id. § 1109(b); see also Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 270-71 (1951) (recognizing the
indenture trustee's standing in the bankruptcy proceedings).
4, See LANDAU, supra note 63, at 223.
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from the prudent person standard.47 In addition, the trustee should examine
every motion filed in the proceeding in order to detect moves that might
negatively affect the bondholders' position. Since under the Bankruptcy Code
actions affecting the debtor's estate can be taken without an actual hearing if
not requested timely by an interesting party, the trustee must be alert. 479 Of
course, once an action with negative affect is detected, the trustee must oppose
the proposed action in court. Naturally, the trustee should also be highly
attentive to any decisions made with regard to the security of the bonds, when
there is such. On top of initiating appropriate actions in protecting the
security, it should also be aware of actions that might erode the security.
Robert Landau suggests that the trustee will not be active in organizing a
security holder committee, unless it is "necessary or desirable under the
particular circumstances." ' Yet admittedly, once the committee has been
organized its interests will be usually identical to those of the trustee, as
ordinarily a committee of unsecured creditors is appointed under Section
1102(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.4 ' In any case, in pursuing adequate
representation for the bondholders, the trustee has standing to seek changes
in the membership or size of such a committee and request the appointment
of an additional committee.482
"Despite its justifiable reluctance to take a position for or against a
reorganization plan" out of fear of exposing itself to substantial liability, the
trustee is still under the duty to act as a prudent person. 4 3 Thus, for example,
the trustee should examine the obligor's disclosure statement, in order to find
any discrepancies between the disclosure and information previously received
by the trustee. In reality, most trustees refrain from making any
recommendation as to the acceptance of the plan.44 But, if the trustee asserts
that there was some flaw in the reorganization plan or the approval procedure,
it must file an objection. Although the bondholders might have already voted
in favor of the plan, they obviously did so without the knowledge that raised
the objection. Moreover, the trustee must also act for the interest of the
minority of the bondholders, if there is such, which voted against the plan.48
47 See Dunham & Borowitz, supra note 464, at 441; but see In re Int'l Power Sec. Corp., 119 F.
Supp. 31 (D.N.J. 1954), (disallowing part of a claim for reimbursement of the trustee's legal expenses,
where it excessively monitored the court proceedings).
479 See 11 U.S.C. § 102(l)(B).
4 LANDAU, supra note 63, at 227.
48 See II U.S.C. § 1102(a).
M See id.
43 Dunham & Borowitz, supra note 464, at 454.
4M See Gross, supra note 456, at 41.
M See id. at 42.
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In this context it must be clear that the trustee represents all bondholders,
including any minority." 6
Another important responsibility is for the trustee to recognize when the
reorganization proceedings have reached a dead-end. When it seems that the
proceedings are not progressing, the trustee should be ready to move forward
and request the bankruptcy court to convert the case into a liquidation case
under Chapter 7.487 This action should be taken only as an act of desperation,
since bondholders have to be assured that the reorganization proceedings are
not effective any more.488 Since the reorganization proceedings assure that the
creditors will not get fewer funds than were available to them upon
liquidation, the liquidation must be a last resort choice.4 9
While the indenture itself, on its remedy provisions, is significant and even
critical for the pursuance of the bondholders' rights, the trustee's importance
as a representative of the bondholders decreases when the Bankruptcy Code
is activated. The remedial provisions are normally not effective once a
bankruptcy petition has been filed, and the automatic stay generated by the
bankruptcy petition puts a stop to remedial proceedings already under way.4'
When bankruptcy proceedings begin, the bondholders themselves - through
committees - make the critical decisions. Some might even argue that the
indenture itself is set aside if a bankruptcy is filed. In many ways, once
bankruptcy proceedings are generated, the bondholders become creditors as
all creditors of the obligor. They are seldom able to take advantage of
remedial provisions in the indenture, whether by themselves or through the
trustee. At the same time, the bondholders' voice, or rather their vote,
becomes their weapon in protecting their rights. Obviously, as argued above,
the bondholders still need the trustee to act in their behalf and to utilize its
powers, knowledge, and accessibility for their protection. As indicated, there
are some points in which the trustee's intervention in not negligible. Yet,
perhaps ironically, this is the situation that requires a relatively less active
trustee.
VI. ACTIONS AGAINST THE TRUSTEE
Trustees have always been exposed to suits and liability. It seems to be an
integral part of their role. The tendency to sue a trustee may derive from two
factors. First, the trustee is one of the entities that was involved in the
4M See, e.g., Woods v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 266-67 (1941).
U7 See 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (1993).
as See Dunham & Borowitz, supra note 464, at 450.
4" See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii).
490 See id. § 362(a)(1).
1999]
112 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:47
issuance, and it also has a continuing role during the life of the bonds.
Therefore, it is seen as being responsible for the bonds, especially in light of
the complex relations it often has with the issuer and the underwriter. Second,
the trustee is seen as the bondholders' guardian, with its title encouraging
people to put their trust in it. So when bondholders face losses and feel
betrayed, they see the trustee as someone who failed to protect them.
Alongside, issuers view the trustee as a burden, continuously putting demands
on the issuer, and thus interfering with the issuer's business operations. Thus,
the trustee is considered to be both part of the group that failed investors and
a factor that contributed to the issuer's failure.
An article by Richard Schreiber and Thomas Wood opened its discussion
on the topic of trustee liability with an entertaining anecdote, that although
told from a trustee's point of view, it is worth quoting: "[w]hen asked why he
robbed banks, notorious 1930's felon Willie Sutton responded: 'because that's
where they keep the money'... it seems fair to name in his honor what might
be called Sutton's Law of Litigation: 'when in doubt, sue the bank.""'49
In the pre-TIA period, the indenture trustee seemed to be able to avoid
many suits, or at least win a ruling in its favor, with the help of exculpatory
clauses included in indentures.4' In the very early case of Sturges v. Knupp,
a court held that an indenture trustee was bound by the same standards of
fiduciary obligations that a private trustee owes his beneficiaries.49 Arguably,
this decision motivated trustees to protect themselves through exculpatory
clauses. At first, typical exculpatory clauses relieved trustees from all liability
except for gross negligence and willful misconduct.4' However, as the duties
of various trustees broadened, specific exculpatory clauses appeared and
multiplied.49 At some point, the clauses seemed to protect trustees from any
error or misfortune.4 The only exceptions might have been fraud and
misappropriation of funds.4' Whereas protection against gross negligence,
willful default and acts done in bad faith was considered against public policy
and therefore unenforceable,498 courts were careful not to deny that "some
weight may be attributed to the exculpatory clause."4" Although it is
491 Richard B. Schreiber & Thomas G. Wood, Caveat Indenture Trustee: Avoiding the Expanding
Scope of Sutton's Law, 121 TitS. &ESTs. 48 (1982).
492 See Obrzut, supra note 41, at 134.
493 Sturges v. Knupp, 31 Vt. 1 (Vt. 1858).




49 See Browning v. Fidelity Trust Co., 250 F. 321, 324 (3d Cir. 1918).
4" Philip M. Payne, Exculpatory Clauses in Corporate Mortgages and Other Instruments, 19
CORNELL LQ. 171,196 (1934).
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impossible to assess how many suits were avoided due to the exculpatory
clauses and although the courts tended to regard those clauses with evident
distaste, they still seemed to offer some immunity to trustees.,
After the TIA's enactment, the scope of the exculpatory clause was
limited.50' Yet, the trustee's role, as defined by the legislation, was also
limited. The narrow articulation of the TIA and the indentures made courts
more reluctant to apply fiduciary elements to the relationships. Instead, courts
favored the contractual-and narrower-interpretation.'
Indeed, the first possible claim against a trustee that comes to mind is the
breach of contract claim. Bondholders can argue that the trustee breached its
duties as specified in the indenture. Of course, as in any contractually based
suit, the bondholders must prove all elements of the action. There should be
no difficulty in showing the validity of the contract and the bondholders'
performance of their duties under the contract. The more difficult obstacle is
proving that the trustee breached the indenture by failing to perform its duties
and that the bondholders were damaged as a result of that breach. The last
two elements would be at the center of the litigation.
A related claim relies on the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing derived from the indenture." 3 The claim is based on the principle that
"the law implies in every contract a covenant to act fairly and in good faith in
the course of performing the contract." 4 As mentioned above, bondholders
increasingly rely on this doctrine. 5 For example, the court in the case of Katz
v. Oak Industries recognized the right of action under the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.'
Another cause of action against the trustee is the claim of breach of
fiduciary duty. As mentioned before, some courts were reluctant to apply
such duty on the trustee, especially in the pre-default situation.' Yet in other
So See Banks, supra note 13, at 533.
501 See Trust Indenture Act of 1939 § 315(d), 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(d) (1997).
5M See discussion supra Section V(E); see also Harffv. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215 (Del. Ch. 1974;
Simon v. Cogan, 542 A.2d 785 (Del. Ch. 1987).
S See discussion supra Part V(E).
so' James E. Spiotto, Overview of Causes of Action Available To The Indenture Trustee, 409
PL/REAL 681,684 (1995).
s See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. R.J.R. Nabisco, Inc., F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(holding that when consistent with the expressed terms of indentures, a trustee's responsibility can be
established through the mechanism of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
W Katz v. Oak Industries, 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986).
5W See, e.g., Groseclose v. Merchant Nat'l. Bank & Trust Co., 335 N.Y.S.2d 652 (Sup. Ct. 1972);
Eldred v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 468 N.W.2d 221 (Iowa 1991).
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cases, such a duty was recognized.' In Elliott Associates, the court refused
to apply a fiduciary duty and distinguished the ruling in Dabney to cases in
which the trustee has a clear conflict of interest.' Therefore, at least in those
situations, it is still possible to win a case against the trustee under this cause
of action.
In addition, some courts have recognized a private right of action under the
TIA.5"° Prior to the Act's passage, indentures, as private contracts, had been
governed by the common law of contracts and fiduciary obligations,
articulated primarily in the state courts."' Since the TIA did not expressly
authorize federal jurisdiction, it was not clear whether such action could be
brought. In Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust, the Second Circuit
recognized the possibility of such a right of action."' In Morris v. Cantor, a
federal district court held that, upon careful reading of the TIA, the Act
created substantive liabilities in those areas it specifically addresses.5"' This
means a bondholder can sue the trustee in federal court, claiming for a breach
of the TIA. For example, bondholders can claim that the trustee did not
comply with the eligibility requirements of the Act.
Since a trustee's conduct can be examined under a negligence standard, it
is possible to bring a suit against it under a negligence cause of action.
Bondholders would simply argue that the trustee was negligent in a specific
act or negligent in the failure to act, like in any other negligence suit."'
Securities fraud is another possible cause of action that bondholders can
use against a trustee. Section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act and
Rule lOb-5, promulgated by the SEC under the Securities Exchange Act
declare that any person is prohibited from directly or indirectly engaging in
any fraudulent practice upon any person in connection with the purchase or
sale of securities.515 A trustee could fall in the category of aiding and abetting.
s See, e.g., Dabney v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 196 F. 2d 668 (2d Cir. 1952); see also Broad v.
Rockwell, 614 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1980).
3o Elliott Assocs. v. J. Henry Schroder Bank & Trust Co., 655 F. Supp 1281 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
510 See, e.g., Zeffiro v. First Pennsylvania Banking & Trust Co., 623 F.2d 290 (3d Cir. 1980) (TIA
provided injured bondholders with federal cause of action for breach of terms mandated by the Act).
5" See Obrzut, supra note 41, at 14445.
512 Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust, 439 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1971). While the Second Circuit
held that the Bankruptcy trustee did not have standing to assert claims against the indenture trustee on
behalf of the bondholders, the court assumed that violation of the TIA would give rise to a cause of action
against the indenture trustee by the bondholders. The court stated in footnote 17 of the holding that if there
is indeed such cause, it would give federal courts jurisdiction. Id.
323 Morris v. Canton, 390 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
524 See James E. Spiotto, Theories of Liability Which Have Been Raised Against The Indenture
Trustee, 409 PLUREAL671,674-75 (1995) (noting a case in which bondholders won a suit against a trustee
based on a negligence theory).
515 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(j) (1998).
THE INDENTURE TRUSTEE
However, since the term of aiding does not specifically exist in the 1934
Securities Exchange Act, the court in Anixter v. Home-Stake Production did
not find a trustee liable under this security fraud claim." 6 Moreover, in
Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, the Supreme Court
emphasized the difference between the primary violation of the security fraud
provisions and the aiding and abetting violations.1 7 The Court explained that
the primary violation occurred when the defendant made a false
representation, either by statement or omission, which the plaintiff relied
upon." ' The Court continued that reliance only on representations made by
others cannot itself form the basis of liability.5"9 In the final analysis, the
Court held the defendant liable as an aider and abettor under § 10(b).5" Thus,
the Court required substantial assistance by the alleged aider in achieving the
primary violation. Therefore, this cause of action against a trustee is likely to
be dismissed by courts, as long as the trustee is not charged with fraudulent
conduct.
One commentator has vigorously attacked the decision of Central Bank,
and he revealed that the SEC has asked Congress to legislatively overturn
Central Bank. 521 Legislation has been introduced in the Senate according to
which Section 10(b) will include aiding-and-abetting liability.522  "Not
surprisingly, legislative efforts to restore [that] liability have met intense and
well-financed opposition from securities professionals and other potential
targets of lOb-5 liability. ' '523 Thus, in the absence of amending legislation,
bondholders might be successful in asserting a primary wrongdoing of the
trustee, rather than filing an aider-and-abettor claim.5"
IX. THE "SUPERTRUSTEE" SUGGESTION: A NOTE
In a recently published article, Yakov Amihud, Kenneth Garbade and
Marcel Kahan propose a new governance structure for publicly issued
s16 Anixter v. Home-Stake Production, 77 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 1996).
517 Central Bank of Denver v. First Insterstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
Sig See id. at 177.
519 See id.
52D See id.
521 See Robert P. Vaian, The Demise of Aider-And-Abettor Liability Under Rule 1OB-5: The
Implications For Banks and Trust Companies, 112 BANKING LJ. 246,269 (1995)
52 See id. at 269.
52 Id. at 269-70.
s2 See, e.g., Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (holding the trustee to be
primary liable under section lob-5 on grounds that it was a knowing participation in a fraudulent scheme
to market bonds).
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corporate bonds. 525 This proposal is designed to be voluntarily adopted by
corporations, and suggests only minor modifications in the TIA. 2 At the
center of the suggestion is a newly introduced "supertrustee," which would
serve as an agent of public bondholders.527 The supertrustee would have "the
duty and power to actively monitor, renegotiate, and enforce bond
covenants." '528 The supertrustee may seem to resemble the "activated" trustee
that was suggested earlier in this article.529 Indeed, the description of the
trustee's role appears to be fairly similar. Yet the proposals significantly
differ. The two concepts do not take the same view, do not use the same
arguments, nor do they come to the same conclusions.
The supertrustee proposal's point of view is the efficiency of corporate
governance.530 Amihud, Garbade and Kahan attempt to offer a solution, which
overcomes the collective action problem53' and the bonding problem.532 Thus,
agency costs and efficiency considerations govern their analysis.533 Surely,
such considerations should never be ignored, but according to this present
study's view efficiency should be achieved along with an adequate protection
and representation of bondholders' interests, and not at the expense of the
latter. Most importantly, the supertrustee proposal fails to address the
problem of conflict of interest that might lead to costly consequences to
bondholders and to society.
According to the proposal of Amihud, Garbade and Kahan, the issuer itself
appoints the supertrustee.534 They argue that the issuer's self interest will be
to appoint a supertrustee that effectively represents the bondholders, since as
a consequence the issuer will benefit from a lower interest rate on the debt. 35
As argued above, 36 the mere appointment of the trustee by the issuer is
problematic since the trustee should not be oriented to the issuer in order to
avoid conflict of interest issues. Moreover, the conflict of interests issue is
accentuated, in light of the further suggestion to appoint the same supertrustee
s25 See Amihud, supra note 74, at 447.
52 See id. at 451-52.
527 See id. at 451
sz Id.
529 See discussion supra Part V(G).
530 See Anihud, supra note 74, at 454.
531 See discussion supra Part V(G).
532 The bonding problem, created by the fluidity of the bonds, is the issuer's inability to have
control over the identity of the debt owners, and therefore loss of efficiency that originates from the
reputation of the lender. See Amihud, supra note 74, at 460.
533 See id. at 454.
5-U See id. at 471.
535 See id. at 454.
536 See discussion supra Part IV(D).
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for several bonds issues of the same company."' 7 As this will surely reduce
the cost of the supertrusteeship and "enhance the economic feasibility of the
proposal," 3 ' it will of course create a clear conflict of interest that lessens the
ability of the supertrustee to act as faithful representative of the
bondholders. 39 Such a conflict was recognized by section 310(b)(1) of the
TIA.54
In addition, according to the Amihud, Garbade and Kahan proposal, the
supertrustee has the ability to negotiate and compromise the terms of the
bonds as an agent of the bondholders. 5" In fact, the bondholders are not
entitled to direct the supertrustee to take any particular enforcement action,52
nor will the supertrustee seek bondholders' approval for waiving a breach in
the indenture in exchange for higher interest payment or additional
collateral.543 It is true that the trustee might act opportunistically in the sense
that its broader responsibility will encourage it to make more positive
enforcement decisions. The prudent man standard of care, however, should
guard the issuer and the bondholders from that risk. Prohibiting bondholders
from making critical decisions about their investment seems an extreme step,
which also reduces the probability that bondholders will be willing to adopt
the supertrustee suggestion. Also notice that any breach of the indenture's
covenants might be an indication of the company's deteriorating financial
stability. Therefore, it is not always in the bondholders' interests to accept a
higher interest payment in exchange for a breach. In such situations the risk
of the investment should be assessed and the bondholders should decide
whether or not to accept that additional risk for the terms offered. Moreover,
the ability of the trustee to negotiate and compromise as an agent of the
bondholders must be restricted by conflict of interest prohibition and
therefore, the subject is best addressed through regulation and not through a
voluntary mechanism, operated by the issuer.
The supertrustee suggestion also included a recommendation to limit the
liability of the supertrustee in order to allow the implementation of the plan.'
While it is agreeable that any broadening of the trustee's responsibilities
increases the exposure of the trustee, the restricted liability suggested by
Amihud, Garbade and Kahan seems excessive. For example, the
537 See id. at 490.
sm Id.
539 See discussion supra Part IV(D).
5Q See The Trust Indenture Act of 1939 1 310(bXI). 15 U.S.C. § 77jjj(bXl) (1997).
541 See Amihud, supra note 74, at 470.
542 See id. at 476.
53 See id. n.105.
34 See id. The supertrustee suggestion is bound to expose the supertrustee to non-meritorious
lawsuits and second-guessing by courts, thereby raising the implicit costs of the supertnusteeship.
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recommendation is that only bondholders who own 10 percent of the
company's bonds can sue the supertrustee (unless the supertrustee acted in bad
faith). 5 Since public debt issues are mostly greater than $100 million, with
a median of $150 million and a mean of $181 million,' and since sometimes
a bondholder owns only a small fraction of the company's bonds, it will be
very difficult for bondholders to sue the trustee under such restriction.
Another limitation on the supertrustee's liability is the standard of care
recommended. Amihud, Garbade and Kahan suggest that "the supertrustee's
decisions with regard to enforcement and renegotiation should be evaluated
under a liability standard analogous to the 'business judgment rule' applicable
to decisions taken by a board of directors."' 7  Under this standard,
bondholders will not be able to question the supertrustee's judgment that are
"merely wrong or substantively unreasonable."' Compared with the TIA's
standard of the prudent person,"49 the business judgment standard is described
by Amihud, Garbade and Kahan as putting fewer limits on the trustee."M° First,
it should be noted that courts would not necessarily interpret the prudent
person standard as a prudent public bondholder. It is arguable that courts
would examine trustees against a prudent private creditor standard. Moreover,
in contrast to the supertrustee suggestion, the prudent person standard allows
taking into consideration the effect of the trustee's conduct on "future
business., 55' According to the suggestion of the activated trustee, the trustee
should be able to weigh the benefits and risks of its conduct - including the
ability of the issuer to recover from a temporary financial or business
difficulty. If such recovery is probable, then it could be in the interest of the
bondholders to refrain from any action. If so, then that is how the trustee
should react since this is how a prudent person would react while considering
the future of the obligor's business. Therefore, the two standards of care
discussed are not significantly different. Also, in any lawsuit on this matter,
courts will engage in "after-the-fact second-guessing" of the trustee's
decisions,552 whatever the standard of care. Although costly, this is what
courts are doing in many areas of the law.
The actual role of the supertrustee, as described in the supertrustee
suggestion, is very similar to the role of the activated trustee suggested in this
S See id.
" See id. at 477-78.
47 Id. at 478.
5" Id
59 See Trust Indenture Act of 1938 § 315(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(c) (1997).
50 See Anihud, supra note 74, at 478-79.
551 d at 479.
552 Id.
THE INDENTURE TRUSTEE
article. The supertrustee has "the duty to monitor, actively and
independently," the compliance of the issuer with the indenture's
provisions.55 a Consequently, it must be given access to information as a
private lender and not permitted to rely on the issuer's statements.554 These
requirements must also apply to the activated trustee.5" In addition, Amihud,
Garbade and Kahan propose a flexible compensation scheme designed to
motivate the supertrustee to monitor the issuer is appealing. According to this
scheme, trustee compensation will be positively tied to changes in the bond
value, short of the influence of fluctuations in interest rates on U.S. treasury
bonds.556 This compensation method is also appealing in the context of the
activated trustee suggestion, since it motivates the trustee to be more active
and more concerned with the interests of the bondholders.
It is the framework of the suggestion that is questionable. Amihud,
Garbade and Kahan even admit that "network externalities" lead to a situation
where "even if some market participants find the proposal attractive, none
may be willing to be the first to adopt it."'557 Potential supertrustees will be
afraid of the inherent liability to which it will be exposed, the potential
bondholders will fear the marketability of such bonds in the secondary market
due to the relatively lower yield, and issuers will be reluctant to put further
restrictions on the management's discretion. Amihud, Garbade and Kahan
suggest that underwriters will assume this role of educating the public,558 but
it still remains problematic, as it is not clear what would be the underwriters'
incentive to do so. Even assuming that the supertrustee suggestion can be
implemented, the question is why should we trust issuers and the other private
parties involved, to make critical decisions regarding the protection of
bondholders. In contrast to the view of Amihud, Garbade and Kahan, the
activated trustee proposal is regulation oriented. It assumes that the
bondholders' interests need to be protected actively and impartially by one
entity, thus reducing the collective action problem. Keeping the bondholders
away from making decisions regarding their investment and preventing them
from suing an unreasonable trustee will not contribute to that goal, but might
be an obstacle to the popularity of the public bond market. The "activated"
trustee-with broader statutory responsibilities-will have the means to act
in a non-opportunistic manner, thus contributing to the corporate and the
553 Id. at 472.
554 See id.
535 See discussion supra Part V(G).
556 According to the suggestion, this is supposed to be achieved by a set of derivative securities. See
Arnihud, supra note 74, at 480.
557 Id. at 489.
55 See U
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society's efficiency. It is hard to believe that such a change can be
accomplished voluntarily, and in any case we should not rely on market forces
to achieve that. As we know, those forces do not always lead to a competitive
market outcome.
X. CONCLUSION
We should not wait for the next upsurge in issuer failures and bondholder
losses in order to amend the TIA. The current structure of the TIA, and the
trustees it creates, affects millions of investors. Not only is their money at
stake, but the stability and growth of the whole market economy.
In June 1996, the House of Representatives passed a bill that called for the
SEC to submit a study on the benefits, possible modification, or total
elimination of the TIA."9 Yet the companion Senate bill did not include that
study request, and no conference report has been published on the issue. The
motivation for that unsuccessful initiative was the call to repeal the TIA due
to the trustees' passivity and redundant role.s Although the attempt is still
unsuccessful, repealing the TIA altogether is like "throwing out the baby with
the bathwater." Although the TIA has several flaws and the trustee's role
needs to be redefined to better achieve the goals of the TIA, the TIA should
be amended to suit modem market conditions rather than repealed.
In fact, the transactions in and between corporations during the last fifty
years have elevated the risk and vulnerability of bondholders. Thus, on the
verge of the 21st Century, there is still a fundamental need for protecting
bondholders and solving the collective action problem. The trustee should be
at the center of the mechanism designed to answer that need.
As argued throughout this article, the current construction of the TIA does
not serve the purpose for which it was enacted or the economic interest of
bondholders. The historical and legislative development in this field has led
to the conclusion that the lack of protection for bondholders could bring
disastrous consequences. It was the TIA's objective to create an active
guardian for bondholders. Yet, interest group pressures contributed to some
critical discrepancies in the Act that could not be corrected by the courts. The
actual restraints on obligors and trustees with regard to the bondholders are
therefore much less effective than the presumptuous legislative intention of
the TIA.
It has also been illustrated that the flaws in the TIA and in the trustee's
characterization by the TIA could and should be cured. The assertion of this
SSee James Gadsden, Trust Indenture Act Under Attack, 113 BANKING LJ. 967, 967 (1996).
S O See id. at 968.
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article is that the pre-default and post-default dichotomy with regard to the
trustee's duties and responsibilities should be revoked. The pre-default
situation bears risks for bondholders as much as the post-default situation
does. Bondholders are not only exposed to dangers originating from
management's opportunism, they also risk loosing their investment due to
conflicts of interest with trustees. In addition, the bondholders' position is
highly jeopardized during the negotiation stage, preceding the closure of the
indenture. As argued, it is more likely that bondholders will successfully
protect their investments before default occurs. Therefore, the trustee should
be able and willing to act effectively in pursuing the bondholders' interests at
that time.
Another assertion of this article is that the trustee must be truly freed from
any conflicting interests in order to be an effective protector of the
bondholders. Impartial judgment and unbiased decision-making at all stages,
including the pre-default situation, are critical for encouraging the trustee to
be an active, prudent and effective representative of the bondholders.
Accordingly, the argument is that the trustee should be activated in the pre-
default situation and judged according to the same standard of care that
governs the trustee in the post-default situation - the prudent person in the
conduct of his own affairs. This proposal equates the trustee to a private debt
lender, which will dramatically contribute to the protection of bondholders
during the whole course of the bonds' life - from the negotiation stage to
foreclosure. The added protection, if adequately backed by legislation, will
also contribute to the efficient corporate governance and better allocation of
efficiencies in society.
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